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INTRODUCTION
For the last two decades, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe
v. Wade has dominated and controlled any discussion of the legality
of abortion in the United States. Today, given the changes in the
Court's composition, the protection provided abortion rights by the
Roe holding is clearly in jeopardy. That does not mean, however,
that the issue of a woman's right to an abortion no longer remains
one of vital constitutional significance. The question of abortion
rights will not simply or easily go away.
Even if the Supreme Court sharply distinguishes or overrules
the Roe opinion, questions would remain, for example, as to whether
an alternative foundation for protecting abortion rights exists in
the Federal Constitution. As long as the Court recognizes some right
of privacy and personal autonomy relating to sexual autonomy,
bodily integrity and procreational decisions, it cannot easily isolate
the decision to have an abortion) For certain Supreme Court Jus-
tices who reject the Roe trimester framework, the problem is not
whether women have some constitutional right to procreational
choice, it is whether and to what extent the state's interest in pro-
tecting potential life may override the woman's right to an abortion. 2
I This issue is itself open to debate. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
2 1n her dissents in Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1982), and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986), Justice O'Connor suggested that strict scrutiny should be used to review laws that
"unduly burden" the right to an abortion. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 814-33; Akron, 462 U.S.
at 452-75. Given the state's compelling interest "in protecting potential human life" during
the entire pregnancy, however, justice O'Connor explicitly recognized that such burdensome
regulations may "withstand" even heightened review. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 828.
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Moreover, several state constitutions explicitly or implicitly protect
a right of privacy that is interpreted to include the right to an
abortions Thus, the resolution of the abortion issue at the federal
constitutional level would still leave complex constitutional issues
open for state resolution.
This article is grounded on the continued existence of a con-
stitutional right on the part of women to make procreational
choices, including, to at least some extent, abortion. Given that
foundation, the purpose of the article is to examine the issue of
abortion from a perspective that is typically ignored or misapplied
in constitutional analysis, the morality of abortion. Indeed, in the
debate over the legality of abortion, both proponents and opponents
of abortion rights often seem to struggle unsuccessfully to fit their
arguments concerning the morality of abortion into an appropriate
constitutional context.
Thus, the anti-abortion (or "pro-life") side condemns its op-
ponents for avoiding the issue of right and wrong. Abortion op-
ponents argue that all that proponents of abortion rights talk about
is the right of a woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy
without even discussing the morality of that choice. 4 The implica-
3 For examples of state constitutions that explicitly protect a right of privacy, see At.AsKA
CONST. art. I, § 22 ("The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be
infringed."); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs,
or his home invaded, without authority of law,"); CAL. CoNsT. art, I, § 1 ("All people are by
nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."); FLA. CoNts-r. art. I, 23 ("Every natural person
has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life, except
as otherwise provided herein."); HAW. Cops'r. art. 1, § 6 ("The right of the people to privacy
is recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.");
Mow". CoNs-r. art. II, § 10 ("The right of individual privacy is essential to the wellbeing of
a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.");
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home
invaded, without authority of law."). These state constitutional provisions may be interpreted
to protect the right to an abortion. See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers,
172 Cal, Rptr. 866, 870-71 (Cal. 1981).
See Jason DeParle, Beyond the Legal Right, WASH. MONTHLY, Apr. 1989, at 28 ("The
problem with much prochoice thinking is suggested by the movement's chief slogan, 'a
woman's right to control her body,' which fails to acknowledge that the great moral and
biological conundrum is precisely that another body is involved."); John Leo, The Moral
Complexity of Choice, U.S. NEWS Sc WORLD REP., Dec. 11, 1989, at 64 ("The problem is not
feminists' pro-choice stance but that the stance has no moral context. All the emphasis is on
rights. None is on the morality of using those rights."). Even some feminist writers raise this
criticism of proponents of abortion rights. Thus, Kathleen McDonnell argues:
Some pro-choice advocates deny that abortion is a moral issue at all. A favorite
slogan for a time in the pro-choice movement was 'Abortion is a health issue,
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tion, of course, is that any such discussion of the morality of abortion
would inevitably conclude that abortions should be prohibited.
Advocates of legal abortion respond to this contention by dis-
missing it as an irrelevant half-truth. "Pro-choice" supporters con-
tend that even if having an abortion is immoral in certain circum-
stances, it should not be illegals The fundamental right of privacy
protected by the Constitution guarantees women the freedom to
make procreative decisions. 6 Women may not always exercise the
right to determine whether or not to have children in a moral or
responsible fashion,' but that is the nature of constitutional rights. 8
The speech of American Nazis may be cruel, insensitive, bigoted
and wrong, but it nevertheless remains protected speech. 9
 The Fed-
eral Constitution reserves the decision to have an abortion, like the
decision to preach intolerance rather than brotherhood, for the
individual, not the state.
not a moral issue.' [Under this view] abortion should be treated in the same
way as any other medical procedure and should not be controlled by criminal
law.
Kathleen McDonnell, Pro-Choice Feminists Must Open up the Abortion Debate, U'I'NE READER,
Mar.–Apr. 1987, at 109, 111.
' See, e.g., L.W. SUMNER, ABORTION AND MORAL THEORY 13-14 (1981) (noting the often
imperfect fit between law and morality and concluding that demonstrations of the wrong-
fulness or evil of abortion do not necessarily justify strict abortion regulations); see also H YMAN
GROSS, A THEORY OF CantuNAL jusricE 16 (1979) (describing acts that are not crimes although
they "have the status of moral atrocity"); Daniel Callahan, An Ethical Challenge to Prochoice
Advocates—Abortion & the Pluralistic Proposition, COMMONWEAL, Nov. 23, 1990, at 681 ("Those
who call themselves 'pro choice' argue that the abortion choice is private and personal to
women and should thus be left to them without the interference of the law.").
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
7 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
781 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("In the final analysis, the holding in Roe v. Wade presumes
that it is far better to permit some individuals to make incorrect decisions than to deny all
individuals the right to make decisions that have a profound effect upon their destiny.").
8 Indeed, it is intrinsic to the nature of rights from a philosophical perspective. As
Sumner explains:
[lin deciding whether to permit women access to abortion we do not want to
know whether, or when, having an abortion would be for the best; instead, we
want to know whether, or when, having an abortion is within a woman's rights.
Since having a right entails having the prerogative not to do what is for the
best, this is a different question. Nothing could prevent an abortion from being
within a woman's rights except the competing right to life of the fetus. Thus,
if a fetus has no right to life before [a] threshold stage, and some such right
thereafter, a prethreshold abortion might well be within a woman's rights
whereas a postthreshold abortion would not.
L.W. SUMNER, THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF RIGHTS 208 (1987).
9 Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1210 (7th Cir. 1978) (expressing court's "repugnance"
for Nazi doctrines, but recognizing.duty under the First Amendment to protect ideas it
"justifiably rejects and despises")..
July 1992] THE CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY OF ABORTION 	 693
Both the anti-abortion critique and its rejoinder are inaccurate
and incomplete. Neither contention adequately addresses the role
of moral interests and argument in constitutional analysis. If, as
current case law holds, there exists a constitutional right of privacy
and personal autonomy that encompasses procreational decisions,")
the alleged immorality of certain abortion decisions cannot be dia-
positive of the constitutionality of anti-abortion laws. Certainly, fun-
damental rights would be of little value if their exercise could be
abridged whenever society collectively viewed the exercise of the
right as morally "bad." Although moral considerations alone may
be a sufficient justification for the regulation of unprotected behav-
ior, the mere assertion of "wrongfulness" cannot be the basis for
restricting the exercise of constitutional rights."
This pro-abortion analysis, however, also begs the question. No
constitutional right is absolute. At some point the state's interests
will justifiably outweigh any constitutionally protected interest of
individuals. Under currently accepted doctrine, the state may over-
ride a woman's right of privacy, or any other fundamental right, if
such action is necessary to further a sufficiently compelling state
interest.' 2 Unless one believes that a historical examination of the
intentions of those who drafted and ratified the Constitution pro-
vides a complete description of all such interests, it is difficult to
imagine how a court could possibly distinguish between a compel-
ling state interest and a trivial one without performing some kind
of moral evaluation of the harm that the exercise of a right may
cause.'s Thus, even those persons who most aggressively argue that
L° See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (rejecting the total
suppression of advertising concerning contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65
(1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (recognizing constitutional right of
access to contraceptives for unmarried couples); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-
86 (1965); see alto Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (distinguishing prior cases
"as construing the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to confer a fundamental
individual right to decide whether or not to beget or bear a child").
" See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 210-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (rejecting argument
that acts condemned as immoral may be banned); see also infra note 15.
0 See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (freedom of speech); Roe, 410 U.S.
at 155 (right of privacy); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (right to travel);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (free exercise of religion).
13 The point should be self-evident. There is no language in the text of the Constitution
that describes when a state interest will outweigh the exercise of a constitutional right. Further,
because what constitutes a compelling state interest must of necessity vary as conditions in
society change, historical analysis cannot provide a diSpositive answer either. Thus, a resort
to contemporary values is unavoidable. Even for noncontroversial compelling state interests,
such as obvious health and safety objectives, determining that a particular interest is even
important, much less compelling, presumes some hierarchy of moral values.
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the decision to have an abortion is a fundamental right cannot
entirely avoid evaluating the morality of abortion decisions. If abor-
tion is a sufficiently immoral act, such that preventing its occurrence
constitutes a compelling state interest, then prohibiting abortion
may well withstand constitutional scrutiny. As a constitutional mat-
ter, therefore, it is necessary to examine the morality of abortion as
a justification for abridging women's rights to privacy and personal
autonomy.
Obvious problems immediately confront a legal writer attempt-
ing to discuss the morality of abortion. The primary hurdle is basic;
how does one discuss and evaluate moral principles in legal terms?
Clearly, the state has the political power to promote moral results."
What is problematic is the method by which the moral principles of
the state are to be evaluated. One potential measure of the impor-
tance of state interests might be popular or public morality. Courts
could examine contemporary community attitudes and values with
regard to an asserted state interest. An inquiry of this kind would
be useful and relevant, though it could hardly be conclusive. For
example, if most Americans believed that interracial marriages were
immoral, those beliefs alone should not require courts to uphold
the constitutionality of antimiscegenation laws on moral grounds. 15
Clearly, some more reasoned and dispassionate judicial analysis is
necessary.
An alternative source is the philosophical literature on abortion,
which is substantial both in its scope and depth. Philosophical schol-
arship, however, can also play only a partial role in this inquiry.
14 Indeed, the state apparently has the power to promote morality by acting to improve
the personal character of individuals as well as attempting to protect society from harmful
behavior. See generally Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (obscene
material has no protection under the First Amendment); Louis Elenkin, Morals and the
Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 Cows+. L. REV. 391, 391-92 (1963) (criticizing Supreme
Court obscenity jurisprudence). See also Justice Brennan's dissent in Paris Adult Theatre 1
v. Slaton:
The traditional description of state police power does embrace the regulation
of morals as well as the health, safety, and general welfare of the citizenry ....
And much legislation, compulsory public education laws, civil rights laws, even
the abolition of capital punishment—is grounded, at least in part, on a concern
with the morality of the community.
413 U.S. at 108-109 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
0 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The fact that the governing
majority in a state has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save
a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.") (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967)).
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One difficulty is essentially interpretative. "Compelling state inter-
ests" are legal constructs, defined and manipulated by lawyers and
judges. Philosophers direct their deliberations at a different audi-
ence from the readers of legal commentary and cases, and their
frame of reference and language of discourse may often strike
lawyers and judges as devoid of merit or relevance.
More importantly, the utility of philosophical literature may be
limited for other reasons. The nature and structure of the American
legal system imposes constraints on legal reasoning that do not apply
to the formal theorizing of philosophers. In a constitutional de-
mocracy with a legal system that demands respect for precedent
while tolerating evolutionary change in the case law, judges and
lawyers cannot write moral arguments on an empty slate. They must
consider the moral intuitions of political actors past and present.
Whatever their analytical merits, philosophical judgments that are
unacceptable or unpersuasive to the people who either create the
law or elect and appoint those who perform law-making and law-
interpreting functions are of dubious legal value or relevance.
Moreover, the normative parameters of constitutional doctrine have
only limited flexibility. Lawmakers and judges must resolve the issue
of abortion within an existing framework of case holdings and
analysis.
Thus, constitutional courts will reject, at least eventually, any
philosophical discussions that substantially exceed the boundaries
of reflective common sense morality, that is, the shared moral in-
tuitions of those who exercise the franchise, even if such discussions
are persuasive to philosophers. No philosophical theory, for ex-
ample, that justifies infanticide or that totally prohibits the killing
of animals is likely to influence the direction of constitutional de-
cisions.' 6 Similarly, a theory of morality that permits the state to
regulate pre-conception reproductive choices creates too much dis-
sonance with accepted authority to be useful to the resolution of
the abortion issue.°
16 See generally Michael Tooley, In Defense of Abortion and Infanticide, in WHAT 1S A PERSON?
Il l (Michael F. Goodman ed., 1988) (suggesting the moral acceptability of infanticide "during
a time interval shortly after birth").
" See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. lnt'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1977) (invalidating
law restricting the distribution of nonprescription contraceptives to licensed pharmacists
because access to contraceptives "is essential to exercise of the constitutionally protected right
of decision in matters of childbearing that is the underlying foundation of the holdings in
Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird and Roe v. Wade"); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
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In short, compelling state interests cannot be defined by public
opinion, but neither can they significantly deviate from convention-
ally acceptable values. The task of the legal commentator is to
temper contemporary values with philosophical judgment. In doing
so, it is necessary to adapt and transform what is valuable in the
latter discipline into an analysis that is coherent and persuasive in
legal terms.
Against this background, it is possible to stake out the poles of
the moral continuum within which the abortion deb5te must be
resolved as a constitutional matter. Two foundational limits can be
recognized (or at least assumed). At one pole, the state has a suffi-
ciently compelling interest to outlaw infanticide, the killing of a
child after birth, regardless of any "rights" of the perpetrator that
the state might infringe by the enforcement of such a law.' 8 At the
other pole, the state may not require women to become pregnant
or prohibit their access to medically accepted contraceptives that
prevent conception. No asserted moral interest in promoting po-
tential life or facilitating the birth of new life can justify this intru-
sion into a woman's privacy and autonomy.' 9
These demarcation lines reflect existing doctrine. Moreover, we
suggest diat these limits are persuasive and accepted because they
express settled and stable common sense moral intuitions about both
the nature of life and evolving personhood and the personal auton-
omy of women. Between these two accepted principles, common
sense and legally cognizable moral philosophy struggle with com-
peting analogies. Is abortion more correctly understood in moral
terms as an act of contraception, as to which the state's interest must
be subordinate to the woman's liberty, or is the more appropriate
comparison infanticide, the immorality of which justifies direct gov-
ernmental interference with a woman's decision to be relieved of
the burdens of motherhood?
" See, e.g., SUMNER, supra note 5, at 225-26 (infanticide is wrong because it violates the
infant's right to life); see also JONATHAN GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING LIVES 164
(1979) (arguing that "the side-effects of killing a wanted, normal baby are so entirely awful
that they alone would constitute an overwhelming objection" to such a practice); 'Senn,
Abortion, Infanticide, and Respect for Persons, in THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION 135, 142-44 ( Joel
Feinberg ed., 2d ed., 1984); Edward A. Langerak, Abortion: Listening to the Middle, in WHAT
15 A PERSON?, supra note 16, at 251, 258 (noting the "social consequences" of infanticide,
including the argument that "infants are so similar to persons that allowing them to be killed
would generate a moral climate that would endanger the claim to life of even young persons").
19 Carey, 431 U.S. at 685 (describing right of privacy cases and concluding "the decision
whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally
proteded choices"); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-54.
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This conflict was never adequately addressed, much less per-
suasively resolved, in Justice Blackmun's Roe v. Wade opinion. In-
stead, the Court deliberately avoided issues of morality and at-
tempted to resolve the abortion debate in an ethical vacuum
through the use of ostensibly neutral legal principles. 20
 The inade-
quacy of that approach is demonstrated in part by the ease with
which judicial opponents of abortion rights can challenge the rea-
soning of Roe." Nor does the widespread popular support for the
holding in Roe substantiate the analysis of the majority opinion. We
suggest that the power of Roe is not based on the Court's reasoning,
but rather on the fact that the line the Court draws in Roe comports
with many people's intuitions regarding the morality of abortion as
it is balanced against the individual rights of women. 22 Similarly,
the massive political opposition to Roe results from contrary moral
intuitions. This article directly confronts that moral conflict in a way
that Roe did not. 23
We recognize that the audience for an article such as this is
necessarily limited. For many readers, either religious or political
" In Roe, the Court declined to evaluate the morality of abortion and concluded that:
[Me need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those
trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are
unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development
of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. Instead, the Court determined that the state has a compelling interest
in protecting potential life at the point of fetal viability on the conclusory grounds that "state
regulation protective of fetal life after viability . . . has both logical and biological justifications."
Id. at 163 (emphasis added). No description of these justifications was offered, however.
21 Justice O'Connor's dissent in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462
U.S. 416, 452 (1983) raises two simple but powerful challenges to the Roe framework. First,
the Roe model is dependent on medical technology that has the effect of both increasing the
safety of abortion procedures in the second trimester and moving the point in time at which
a fetus becomes viable to an earlier and earlier date in the gestation period. See id. at 453-
59. Second, the choice of viability as the point at which the state's interest in protecting
potential life becomes compelling is completely arbitrary. See 451. at 461. "Potential life is no
less potential in the first weeks of pregnancy than it is at viability or afterward." Id. Nothing
in the Roe opinion explains why only post-viability potential life should be of importance to
the state.
22 See generally Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court on Abortion.' A Survey, in ABORTION,
MEDICINE AND THE LAW 161, 169 ( J. Douglas Butler & David F. Walbert eds., 3d ed., 1986)
(describing general congruence between conventional morality and of the result of Roe v.
Wade).
22 If the constitutional protection provided for women's procreational rights is ultimately
eliminated, many of the arguments presented here also may be appropriate in legislative
deliberations that determine how to regulate abortions. Because the authors of this article
are committed to an interpretation of the Constitution that recognizes and protects the right
to make procreational decisions after conception, at least to some extent, we have not directed
our analysis toward legislative issues. This article is primarily a constitutional inquiry into the
conflict between women's rights and the state's interests in promoting its moral goals.
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convictions preclude a secular reconsideration of the abortion ques-
tion. We also recognize that no article of tolerable length can address
every issue that might arise with regard to the constitutionality of
abortion regulations. Thus, our goals are relatively modest. We
write for those readers for whom the abortion issue remains a
difficult moral and legal question. In addition, we propose a begin-
ning inquiry, an initial elaboration of a constructive way to discuss
the legality of abortion in a post-Roe era, that answers some ques-
tions and offers criteria for examining the many issues that remain
unresolved.
Section I of the article considers the ethical legitimacy of abor-
tion by first determining the moral standing of the conceptus. 24 We
argue that the actual characteristics of the newly formed conceptus
do not permit an accurate analogy between early abortions and
infanticide. Indeed, the primary moral status of the conceptus is
predicated not on its actual condition, but on its developmental
potential. In focusing on the potential of what the conceptus may
become, and not on its immediate attributes, we suggest that early
abortion and contraception are similar interventions in a develop-
mental continuum that might ultimately result in birth. Although
early abortions and the use of contraceptives are not entirely morally
commensurate, they are also not sufficiently distinct to justify state
intrusions into a woman's personal autonomy to prohibit the former
while permitting the latter. 25
24
 See infra notes 30-122 and accompanying text. We use "conceptus" to refer to the
developing zygote through all its Stages. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 470 (1986). The zygote is properly termed a "morula" during
the first week, a "blastocyst" during the second week, an "embryo" from then until the eighth
week, and a "fetus" from that point until birth. See MARTIN H. JOHNSON & BARRY J. EVERETT,
ESSENTIAL REPRODUCTION 224-229 (1988). Using "conceptus" allows us to set aside the fine
distinctions marked by these terms until and unless they become relevant.
n See infra notes 80-122 and accompanying text. We use the term "contraception" and
its cognates strictly, to refer to devices or practices that prevent conception. Obviously, in its
colloquial use "contraception" includes devices that operate post-conception and prevent
implantation. Many authors argue that early abortion and contraception are morally equiv-
alent. Sumner, for example, explains that "the moral issues raised by early abortion are
precisely those raised by contraception." See SUMNER, supra note 5, at 152. He argues that
the fetus has not yet acquired sentience (Sumner's criterion for moral standing) at the time
of an "early" abortion, so the early abortion is like contraception in that it merely "prevents
the emergence of a new being with moral standing." Id. at 151-52; see also GLOVER, supra
note 18, at 65. Glover suggests that under a utilitarian view that values total lives worth living
or total worthwhile lives lived, killing is no different from contraception because both acts
reduce the number of worthwhile lives. Glover's own view is that abortion, contraception
and infanticide "are all on the same level of direct wrong" because they all similarly reduce
the amount of worthwhile life. Id. at 139. Glover does distinguish abortion, nonconception
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Although this analysis rejects the primacy of conception, it
recognizes that conception and developmental changes in the con-
dition of the conceptus matter in moral terms, as does the increasing
actualization in the conceptus of those attributes that constitute
personhood. Indeed, we suggest that at some point during the
gestation period, the moral status of the conceptus may become
fully analogous to that of a newborn baby. That point is not deter-
mined precisely in this article, although we consider criteria to be
used in making the determination. 26 For the vast majority of abor-
tions, which are performed during the first trimester of preg-
nancy,27 however, we contend that the moral status of the conceptus
will not justify interference with the woman's autonomy choices
under the framework proposed.
Section II provides an alternative framework for identifying
that period during a woman's pregnancy in which the state's moral
interests may outweigh her privacy and autonomy right to terminate
the pregnancy. While recognizing that development •matters, and,
therefore, that the state's interest increases during the gestation
period, we suggest that exclusive attention in the abortion debate
to the status of the conceptus is unwarranted. Considering the
development of the conceptus in isolation directs the analysis down
two problematic roads. Initially, it may lead one to search for the
dispositive moment when the development of the conceptus triggers
the state's compelling moral interest in its preservation (or, stated
differently, the moment when the conceptus achieves the moral
standing of an infant or person). Alternatively, after conceding the
futility and arbitrariness of determining a critical point in time that
is morally distinct from the previous moment, one may be led to
insist that abortion must be either criminalized or tolerated through-
out the gestation period.
We argue that an adequate analysis must examine both the
changing nature of the woman's interests during pregnancy and
and infanticide on the basis of side effects—abortion and infanticide typically cause the
mother grief, use medical resources and damage society in general. See id. at 143. Yet he
also notes that for early abortions, unlike infanticide, these side effects are minimal. Id.
26 See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
22 See Alan F. Guttmacher & Irwin H. Kaiser, The Genesis of Liberalized Abortion in New
York: A Personal Insight, in ABORTION, MEDICINE AND THE LAW, supra note 22, at 238 (in 1980
over 90% of abortions in the United States were performed during the first trimester, over
half at eight weeks of gestation or less); Christopher Tietze, Demographic and Public Health
Experience with Legal Abortion: 1973-80, in ABORTION, MEDICINE AND THE LAw, supra note 22,
at 289, 298 (percentage of abortions in U.S. occurring in second trimester between 1973 and
1980 ranged from a high of 14.6% in 1973 to a low of 8.7% in 1980).
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the changing status of the conceptus. Unlike the Roe framework, in
which the woman's privacy and autonomy interests remain uniform
during the entire pregnancy while the state's interest in preserving
potential life increases by trimester," we suggest that the woman's
interest in terminating a pregnancy may decline significantly as the
pregnancy progresses." This complex change in the woman's in-
terest provides additional information, and a useful shift in dis-
course, that may assist courts in balancing the competing concerns
at issue in the constitutional evaluation of abortion restrictions.
1. THE MORAL DEBATE
A. The Extreme Positions
For many people, abortion is a morally serious act, justified in
some circumstances and not in others. Although it is difficult to
describe the range of positions that exist with regard to the morality
of abortion, we can posit an artificial symmetry that establishes the
28 Site Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63 (state interest in preserving the health of the pregnant
woman and in protecting potentiality of human life "grows in substantiality as the woman
approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes 'compelling").
"See infra notes 123-77 and accompanying text. The importance of evaluating the
woman's interest over time as well as that of the developing conceptus cannot be overstated.
Looking at an act such as abortion in the abstract and in isolation ignores the basic reality
that we determine the morality of behavior by considering both its effects and its justification.
Thus, the legal prohibition against maternal infanticide is explained in significant part by
recognizing the moral value of the life of the infant. But surely another foundation for our
legal certainty that infanticide may be prohibited is our conviction that the mother has no
reasonable justification for destroying a baby living independently outside of her body. Even
if the burdens of motherhood are experienced as overwhelming and intolerable, obvious
alternatives exist for reducing those burdens while maintaining the life of the child. Because
such alternatives are unavailable under current technology during the gestation period,
abortion involves a more complex moral analysis.
From a purely constitutional perspective, the issue can be described this way. In order
to outweigh a woman's privacy and autonomy rights, the state must assert a compelling state
interest that requires the sacrifice of those rights. For most courts, protecting the life of an
infant would easily satisfy this rigorous standard of review. It is highly doubtful, however,
that strict scrutiny is appropriate or necessary to review the prohibition of infanticide. The
personal interests the mother of an infant can assert as the basis for destroying it involve
very different concerns from those that exist while the conceptus is developing within her
body. Nor do we typically understand a parent's interest in familial autonomy to include the
physical destruction of family members since that obliterates the very social institution the
right of family autonomy is attempting to maintain. Thus it seems likely that whatever
interests a woman may assert to avoid the burdens of motherhood by killing a child can be
outweighed by any legitimate state interest. Even if the value of an infant's life did not
constitute a compelling state interest, the state could act to protect the child's life because
there is no countervailing interest of constitutional significance to limit the exercise of its
police powers in this circumstance.
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parameters of debate. On one side, "pro-life" or "conservative"
factions advocate a rigorous regulatory approach to abortion. From
this perspective, abortion is always, or almost always, a grievously
immoral act. In the vast majority of cases, abortion is culpable
homicide, usually murder. 3° On the other side, "pro-choice" or "lib-
eral" factions advocate an unqualified "deregulatory" position on
abortion. From this perspective, abortion is a matter of purely pri-
vate concern for the woman involved. It is morally comparable to
an appendectomy or to plastic surgery. 3 '
Both views in this model endorse a uniform evaluation of abor-
tion that relies on sharp lines to divide morally acceptable from
morally unacceptable conduct. Both views also identify particular
events as crucial moral thresholds. To the conservative, conception
is critical. Contraception is either not immoral or it is of a qualita-
tively distinct and reduced level of immorality than abortion. To
the liberal, birth is critical. Abortion is either not immoral or it is
of a qualitatively distinct and reduced level of immorality than
infanticide. Finally, both of these views are entirely one-dimensional
in their moral evaluations. The conservative does not identify any
substantial change in the woman's interests pre- and post-concep-
tion. Only the change in the status of the conceptus is relevant. 32
3° "In the simplest characterization, a pro-choicer would hold that the decision to abort
a pregnancy is to be made only by the woman; the state has no right to interfere. And a pro-
lifer would hold that, from the moment of conception, the embryo or fetus is alive; that this
life imposes on us a moral obligation to preserve it; and that abortion is tantamount to
murder." Carl Sagan & Ann Druyan, Is It Possible to Be Pro-Life and Pro-Choice?, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Apr. 22, 1990 (Parade Magazine), at 4; see also Ernest Van den Haag, 'Is There a Middle
Ground?, NAT'L REV., Dec. 22, 1989, at 29, 31 ("A principled and intense minority of Amer-
icans think of abortion as murder."); Ross Laver & Randy Fisher, The Debate About Life,
MACLEAN'S, July 31, 1989, at 20 (noting that "[florae anti-abortiOn groups insist that it is
wrong to destroy an embryo or fetus at any stage of development. . land] some feminists
oppose any limits on abortion, arguing that the rights of the fetus at any stage of its
development must be subservient to the rights of the mother"). But see Michael Kinsley, TRB
From Washington, NEW REPUBLIC, July 15 & 22, 1991, at 4 (arguing that pro-life groups do
not really think that abortion is the equivalent of murder since they advocate punishing the
physician who performs an abortion but not the woman who procures an abortion).
'' Sagan & Druyan, supra note 30, at 4.
52
 Vincent Genovesi has written:
[A]bortion ought to be seen for what it really is: a matter of human life and
death. As such, the facts regarding abortion must be kept distinct from any
romanticizing over the rights of sexual freedom or the liberties of a sexual
revolution. Abortion is not a matter simply of sexuality, and it is not a form of
contraception. Moreover, any clear exposition of abortion ought quickly to
disentangle itself from the issues of women's rights and the right to privacy.
Vincent J. Genovesi, Challenging the Legal Status of Abortion: A Matter of Moral Obligation,
AMERICA, Dec. 14, 1985, at 417, 421.
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Similarly, the liberal does not identify significant differences in a
conceptus immediately pre- and post-delivery." Only the removal
and separation of the conceptus from the mother's body is impor-
tant.
Under common sense morality, the abrupt discontinuities pro-
posed by the liberal and the conservative are difficult to accept.
Intervention in the development of a conceptus one minute after
conception does not seem to be the moral equivalent of killing a
three-year-old." Similarly, most of us feel strongly that the decision
to have an abortion late in the third trimester has considerable
moral significance." It may well be justifiable in some special cases,
but it is clearly something that requires substantial justification. Very
late abortion is not purely a matter of subjective preferences, bereft
of moral overtones. Unlike either extreme view, which does not
vary the moral status of abortions depending on the length of
pregnancy, common sense morality views the decision to have an
abortion as progressively more problematic in moral terms as ges-
tation continues. Unlike the polar views, which use a particular
event—fertilization or delivery—to mark a crucial moral threshold,
common sense morality is far less confident that sharp moral bound-
aries exist.
Although the two sides of the abortion debate described above
are presented as artificial constructs for analytical purposes, it
should be clear that the conservative position more closely approx-
imates actual advocacy in the American political spectrum." With-
33
 Thus, the liberal position ignores the fact that "birth apparently does not constitute a
major breakpoint in the development of neural function from prenatal to postnatal life."
G.H.A. Visser & H.F.R. Prechtl, Movements and Behavioral States in the Human Fetus, in FETAL
AND NEONATAL DEVELOPMENT 581, 586 (Cohn T. Jones ed., 1988).
m See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION, THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 121 (1990) (de-
scribing human intuition "that abortion particularly early in pregnancy is not really the
equivalent of killing an already born person").
35 See, e.g., Callahan, supra note 5, at 686-87 (noting widespread support for restricting
late term abortions on moral grounds); Langerak, supra note 18, at 252 (describing belief
that "late abortions are significantly more morally problematic than early ones" as widely
shared).
36 See, e.g., B.J. George, Jr., State Legislatures versus the Supreme Court: Abortion Legislation
in the 1980s, in ABORTION, MEDICINE AND THE LAW, supra note 22, at 23, 25 (noting that "in
most American jurisdictions prior to 1967, abortions were allowed only to save the lives of
pregnant women; to activists within the self-proclaimed right-to-life-movement, the United
States Constitution should be amended today to prohibit all abortion, or at a minimum all
that are unnecessary to save maternal life"); see also Albert M. Pearson and Paul M. Kurtz,
The Abortion Controversy: A Study in Law and Politics, in ABORTION, MEDICINE AND THE LAW,
supra note 22, at 119-21 (describing proposed constitutional amendments to protect fetal life
from the moment of conception).
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out constitutional limitations, laws to criminalize abortions from the
moment of conception throughout the gestation period are realistic
possibilities. 37 There seems much less commitment to establishing a
woman's absolute discretion to terminate a pregnancy immediately
before delivery." Thus, we will begin our analysis by considering
the merits of the conservative position.
B. Abortion as Murder
According to the conservative view, abortion is morally wrong
because it kills the conceptus. But just why is killing the conceptus
morally wrong? One response is that it is wrong simply because the
conceptus is alive." This response is at variance with common sense
morality, which attaches limited moral import to the taking of life
as such. Killing bacteria or pulling up weeds, for example, has little
moral significance. Consequently, if killing the conceptus is morally
wrong, there must be certain distinctive features of this event that
differentiate it from other acts of killing that we do not condemn
on moral grounds. 4°
In evaluating the wrongfulness of abortion, philosophers often
approach the problem by examining characteristics that the concep-
tus must have to give it, in contrast to bacteria or weeds, "moral
standing."'" If it possesses moral standing, the conceptus has rights
and interests that others must take into account in their delibera-
tions and actions. Among the rights of an individual with moral
37 In response to Roe v. Wade, "Illinois and Kentucky declared their intent to prohibit
abortions should the Supreme Court reverse its constitutional stance or should the Consti-
tution be amended to permit them to do so. Idaho . . . has standby provisions to come into
force through gubernatorial proclamation should the constitutional picture change." George,
supra note 36, at 31. Illinois law also proclaims, "The unborn child is a human being from
the time of conception and is, therefore, a legal person for purposes of the unborn child's
right to life and is entitled to the right to life from conception under the laws and Constitution
of this State." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 38, 81-21 (Smith-Hurd 1991).
Most recently, Louisiana House Bill 112, enacted into law June 18, 1991, states in its
preamble, "it is declared to be the public policy of the state of Louisiana that it has a legitimate
compelling interest in protecting, to the greatest extent possible, the life of the unborn from
the time of conception until birth." See New Measure Limiting Louisiana Abortion, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 1991, at All.
38 Indeed, very few abortions occur in the third trimester. See Tietze, supra note 27, At
298 (between 1973 and 1980 the percentage of abortions in the U.S. occurring after 21 weeks
of gestation changed from a high of 1.4% in 1973 to a low of .08% in 1980).
59 See generally GLOVER, supra note 18, at 41-42.
40 Id. at 48.
4 ' The term is taken from Sumner and connotes an entity that has moral rights; that is,
the entity "ought to be protected in some specified activity, or ought to be treated in some
specified manner." SUMNER, supra note 5, at 30.
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standing is the right to life. So if the conceptus has moral standing,
other things being equal, killing it is morally wrong. 42
1. Moral Standing
We can distinguish two arguments for giving the conceptus
moral standing. The first is that the conceptus has moral standing
because of its actual characteristics. Alternatively, one could argue
that the conceptus has moral standing because of its potential abil-
ities or capacities. 45 We will characterize these two positions as the
actuality argument and the potentiality argument.
a. The Actuality Argument
The central thesis of the actuality argument is that the concep-
tus has moral standing from the moment of conception on, not
because of what it may eventually become, but on the basis of its
42
 In the abortion context, "to ask whether fetuses have moral standing is ... to ask
whether they have a moral right to life .... If fetuses have a right to life, then (some or all)
other persons have a moral duty to extend to the fetus some specified protection of life." Id.
" Considerable confusion surrounds the issue of potentiality in the abortion debate. To
some scholars, the question is whether the conceptus is the kind of organism that in the
normal course of events will develop into a being with moral standing. Philip Devine, for
example, describes a "potentiality principle" under which the right to life of the fetus can be
protected:
According to this principle, there is a property, [however defined] such that (i)
it is possessed by adult humans, (ii) it endows any organism possessing it with
a serious right to life, and (iii) it is such that any organism potentially possessing
it has a serious right to life even now—where an organism possesses a property
potentially if it will come to have that property under normal conditions for
development.
PHILIP DEVINE, THE ETHICS OF HOMICIDE 94 (1978); see also ROSALIND HURSTHOHSE, BEGIN-
NING LIVES 72 (1987) (defining the potentiality view as the belief that "the foetus, from the
moment of conception, is morally unique, unlike anything else in being not an actual but a
potential human being or person"). Langerak explicitly distinguishes a potential person (for
example, a human fetus) from a possible person (for example, a human sperm or egg). See
Langerak, supra note 18, at 253. A possible person will not "become an actual person in the
normal course of its development," but it could, "under certain causally possible conditions,
become an actual person." Id.
We use the term "potential" differently. On the one hand, we do not limit the meaning
of the term as narrowly as do these scholars. We are not at all certain that a human egg does
not also have the potential to become a person even though its place in the developmental
continuum precedes that of the conceptus. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. On
the other hand, our focus is on the individual potential of particular organisms, not the
generic potential of organisms of a particular kind. Thus, we would argue that a conceptus
with an incurable condition that will inevitably result in its death early in the gestation period
is not a potential person, even though it is the kind of thing that typically does develop into
a person. Potentiality in our sense involves individual possibility. See infra notes 44-45,61—
62,85-91 and accompanying text.
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current characteristics and qualities. The conceptus is thus no dif-
ferent morally from a child or an adult, whom we value because of
who they are today, without regard to their future development."
This thesis is a common part of the political rhetoric of the abortion
debate, although it appears much less regularly in the legal litera-
ture. It is subject to several critical challenges.
Initially, critics can confront proponents of the actuality argu-
ment with a direct hypothetical. Assume a pregnant woman learns
five weeks after conception that there is no possibility that the
conceptus will be born alive. The conceptus will die during the first
five months of the gestation period. In that circumstance, would it
be morally permissible for the woman to have an abortion? Clearly,
no one would defend killing a six-year-old child with only four
months to live; for many individuals, however, the decision to ter-
minate a pregnancy that could not result in birth would represent
a morally acceptable choice.
Not everyone will agree with this conclusion. Some opponents
of abortion would condemn this decision to terminate a pregnancy,
as well as all other abortions. If one acknowledges that abortion in
this situation is morally permissible, however, it is difficult to defend
the actuality argument with rigor. Unlike the way it regards children
and adults, common sense morality seems to ground the moral
status of the conceptus in its potential. Where no potential exists,
the question of moral standing changes substantially.
The second problem with the actuality argument relates to the
difficulty of finding a justification for conferring moral standing on
the conceptus on the strength of its actual characteristics. Conser-
vatives sometimes argue that the conceptus has a right to life either
because of its biological properties, that is, because it is a member
of the species Homo sapiens (the species argument), or, more ambig-
uously, because it possesses those qualities that characterize a person
for moral and legal purposes (the personhood argument). The
species and the personhood arguments demonstrate common weak-
nesses.
" See Daniel J. Callahan, Counseling Abortion Alternatives: Can It Be Value-Free?, AMERICA,
Aug. 31—Sept. 7, 1991, at 110, 112 ("Prolife counselors, by and large, view the fetus as a
human life that is morally equal in value with all other human lives."); Edd Doerr, Abortion:
Right or Wrong?, USA TODAY, Jan. 1989, at 51, 53 (noting that the National Right to Life
Educational Trust Fund argues, "we are compelled to recognize that there is no essential
difference between the fertilized ovum we all once were, and the embryo, the fetus, the
infant, adolescent and adult we all grew or are growing to be").
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i. The Species Argument
The species argument relies on two premises. The first premise,
that the conceptus is human, is relatively uncontroversial; the ge-
netic composition of the conceptus is indeed that of the species
Homo sapiens. The second premise is considerably more problematic:
that all beings with this genetic structure from the time of
conception45 have moral standing precisely and solely because of
these physical properties. 46 This premise invites the rejoinder that
45
 The language in the text oversimplifies the fertilization process. It is doubtful that, in
technical terms, there is a single moment of conception. See, e.g., ROBERT EDWARDS, LIFE
BEFORE BIRTH 53 (1989); TRIBE, supra note 34, at 122-24. At some point, however, the
fertilization process may properly be deemed complete.
" May makes the argument simply, but in general terms: "membership in the human
species . . . is a morally significant fact simply because human animals are a different kind
of animal from other animals." William E. May, What Mattes a Human Being to be a Being of
Moral Worth?, 40 THOMIST 416, 442 (1976). Thus, humans are moral beings because they
are "minded" beings, capable of thinking, understanding, choosing and loving. Id. at 424.
Accordingly, "the reason why a human being is a being of moral worth is rooted in his
membership in the human species. What makes an entity to be a human being simultaneously
makes it to be a being of moral worth." Id. at 421; see also ALAN DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF
MORALITY 171 (1977) (supporting the natural kind argument that "if respect is owed to
beings because they are in a certain state, it is owed to whatever, by its very nature, develops
into that state").
More often this same claim is made more specific by focusing on the genetic code of the
conceptus. According to Judge Noonan, for example:
The positive argument for conception as the decisive moment of humanizatiOn
is that at conception the new being receives the genetic code. It is this genetic
information which determines his characteristics, which is the biological carrier
of the possibility of human wisdom, which makes him a self-evolving being. A
being with a human genetic code is man.
John T. Noonan, Jr., An Almost Absolute Value in History, in THE MortALrry OF ABORTION:
LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 57 ( John T. Noonan, Jr. ed., 1970).
Grisez also argues that the conceptus at conception has an immediate right to life, upon
receiving its complete genetic code. The zygote is "human" at this time because the human
species has a unique DNA Code. The zygote is also an individual from conception onward
because it has "derived half of its genetic make-up from each parent [and, therefore,] is
unlike any cell that belongs to either of them." GERMAIN G. GlusEz, ABORTION: THE MYTHS,
THE REALITIES, AND THE ARGUMENTS 14 (1970).
Similarly, Tribe describes the argument of Dr. John Willke of the National Right to Life
Committee as insisting that the "embryo must be a separate human person, not simply living
tissue, from the moment of conception since the crucial forty-six chromosomes that determine
a person's separate and distinct genetic identity are all present in the fertilized egg." TRIBE,
supra note 34, at 117.
One response to these arguments challenges their technical accuracy in describing the
singleness, individuality or completeness of the conceptus after fertilization:
We know scientifically that at the moment of fertilization a new individual in
the sense of singleness does not arise; . . . twinning can occur at stages well
beyond the time of fertilization. Also fusion of early stage embryos can be
performed yielding a single individual. Therefore, in the early stages of devel-
July 1992] THE CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY OF ABORTION 	 707
it is unjustified "speciesism."47 Even more problematic, it simply
assumes what is in debate without providing any -criteria or expla-
nations to support its conclusions."
Clearly, not all biological characteristics are relevant to moral
standing. Most of us would reject as obviously unjustified and un-
derinclusive the claim that only men or the white race have moral
standing. The claim that all beings with legs have moral standing is
equally as unjustified and overinclusive. Just as having a certain skin
color, gender or extremities seems unrelated to determining
opment beyond fertilization an individual has not yet been firmly and stably
established. The early embryo is in fact an aggregate of cells which have not
yet formed a distinct collective in the sense of an individual organism.
The Human Life Bill: Hearings on S.158 Before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers (1981),
reprinted in ABORTION, MEDICINE AND THE LAW, supra note 22, app. 2 at 456-57 [hereinafter
Human Life Bill] (statement of Dr. Clifford Grobstein)• see also TRIBE, supra note 34, at 122-
24. In addition, many of the above arguments, while cast in terms of the actual condition of
the conceptus, seem to emphasize the potential development encoded in its genetic structure
as the key to its acquiring human qualities. Most problematically, however, what is lacking in
these arguments is any explanatory link that justifies equating human DNA with moral
worth.
47 See, e.g., DEVINE, supra note 43, at 51 (explaining that under a "species principle,"
"those creatures protected by the moral risk against homicide are the members of the human
species, and only the members of the human species"); GLOVER, supra note 18, at 50 (1977)
(defining speciesism as the belief that human life should be "treated as having a special
priority over animal life simply because it is human"). •
48 This criticism cannot be avoided by generalizing the species argument. Instead of the
first premise, which gives moral standing only to human beings, we can adopt one that gives
it to all members of all species of a certain kind. But what kind of species should count? The
basic idea is to look for species whose paradigm members unquestionably have moral stand-
ing. Homo sapiens counts because normal, adult human beings have moral standing. This
contention becomes uselessly circular, however, unless an independent reason is provided to
explain why adult human beings have moral standing. They cannot have it simply because
they are members of the species, Homo sapiens. Instead, they must have it because of some
general qualities, perhaps on account of their mental capacities and abilities, that Homo sapiens
and other species may possess. Moreover, in order to defend this claim, the conservative
must explain how having such properties establishes moral standing. That is, she needs to
explain why killing an entity with those properties would be morally wrong. Why, for
example, is killing entities with higher intelligence morally distinct from killing entities with
other attributes shared with Homo sapiens, such as having two legs?
Sumner sets out yet another criticism of the species argument. According to the species
argument, moral standing "extends to the edges of a natural kind [species] whose mature
members are normally rational." SUMNER, supra note 5, at 97. There is no consistent basis,
however, Sumner argues, for valuing rationality when comparing kinds of creatures, while
treating rationality as irrelevant to moral worth when comparing individuals of the same
species. Id. at 98.
Devine views the species argument much more sympathetically. DEVINE, supra note 43,
at 51-57. Although he aggressively defends the species argument against particular criticisms,
he says very little about why members of the human species deserve elevated moral status,
other than to note that this principle is "founded on kinship or solidarity that obtains among
members of the same species," Id. at 50.
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whether a being has a right to life, we need to be told why having
the genetic structure of the species Homo sapiens should matter
morally. 49
 The bald assertion that it is just-wrong to kill humans,
without more, is ad hoc and question-begging. 5°
ii. The Personhood Argument
The personhood argument also rests on two premises: first,
that the conceptus is a person from the moment of conception and,
second, that all persons have moral standing. It is subject to criti-
cisms similar to those directed at the species argument. The pro-
ponent of this position must connect having the right to life with
certain non-question-begging characteristics or properties connot-
ing personhood. Further, she must establish that, from conception
on, the conceptus has those properties. 5 ' There are few obvious
options for meeting these criteria.
We have already considered biological properties while dis-
cussing the species argument. As we saw, the connection between
such properties, including genetic structure, and moral standing is
unsupported. 52 The connection between biological properties and
49 See GLOVER, suprdnote 18, at 50-5 ("It is not in itself sufficient argument for treating
a creature less well to say simply that it is not a member of our species. An adequate
justification must cite relevant differences between the species."); Daniel Wilder, Concepts of
Personhood: A Philosophical Perspective in DEFINING HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL
IMPLICATIONS 19 (Margery W. Shaw & A. Edouard Doudera eds., 1983) (arguing that aside
from religious adherents who believe that humans have a unique moral status because their
special relationship with God is not shared by other species, "the thesis that humans should
be ascribed rights simply for being human has received practically no support from philos-
ophers"); see also SUMNER, supra note 5, at 92 ("[A]n individual's gender, race or species does
not in itself have any implications for his/her moral status, and so fastening upon any of these
divisions as significant in itself is mere bigotry.").
'° The species argument is complicated further by the variation in developmental out-
comes that are determined between conception and the implantation of the fertilized ovum
on the wall of the uterus. "[U]ntil implantation, one cannot know whether the conceptus will
be a hydatidiform mole, a chorionic tumor, or an individual." Rebecca j. Cook, Legal Abortion
and Human Life, in ABORTION: MEDICAL PROGRESS AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS 211, 223 (Maeve
O'Connor & Ruth Porter eds., 1985). In literal terms, if genetic structure establishes human
life, one must argue at best that the nonimplanted fertilized ovum was human for a very
short period and then ceased to be.
51 See, e.g., SUMNER, supra note 5, at 32. Sumner argues that a criterion for moral standing
must point to properties that have "some plausible connection with the possession of certain
moral rights." Id. Accordingly, he concludes, "[t]here must, therefore, be some reason for
thinking that it is in virtue of an entity's possessing just these properties that it has such rights,
that these properties mark the crucial watershed between entities with those rights and entities
without them." Id.
52
 Indeed, correlating any biological condition of the conceptus or fetus with moral
standing is difficult during the first part of the gestation period. Most "developmental
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personhood is equally unsupported. A theory that personhood con-
sists of having a soul is formally adequate but deficient because of
the axiomatic assumptions on which it is based." Defining person-
hood in terms of mental abilities may be a promising possibility, 54
but the conceptus, early in the gestation period, has extremely
limited mental abilities. On the basis of its actual mental condition,
without regard to its potential, it would be impossible to distinguish
the human conceptus from other organisms to which common sense
morality does not accord a right to life.55 Thus, if personhood is
milestones" during gestation do not involve "uniquely human characteristics." For example,
"[a]ll animals respond to stimuli and move of their own volition. Large numbers are able to
breathe. But that doesn't stop us from slaughtering them. Reflexes and motion and respir-
ation are not what makes us human." Sagan & Druyan, supra note 30, at 7. Nor are there
other biological developments that intrinsically constitute the achievement of human person-
hood. See Human Life Bill, supra note 46, at 459 (statement of Dr. James Neal) ("At some
point as the amazing chain of events that results in a fertilized egg becoming a human being
unfolds, we acquire the basis for those attributes that make us humans, but . . . 1 can find
no biological basis for saying at exactly what stage in development human personhood
begins.").
"The "traditional Catholic" view of ensoulment, for example, holds that what makes an
organism a human being is the spiritual soul, the existence of which begins "at the moment
of its 'infusion' into the body." See Joseph F. Donceel, &J., A Liberal Catholic's View, in THE
PROBLEM OF ABORTION, supra note 18, at 15. Most Catholics adhere to the "theory of imme-
diate animation," believing that the soul is infused at the time of conception. Id.
Commentators have frequently recognized the problematic nature of arguments predi-
cated on the conceptus having a soul and the injustice of applying laws based on such an
assumption to individuals who challenge this religious doctrine. See, e.g., ROBERT N. WENN-
BERG, LIFE IN THE BALANCE 43-46,52 (1985); Tooley, supra note 16, at 83-114.
While moral principles should not be excised from constitutional debate simply because
they derive from a religious source, it must be clear that exclusively religious assumptions
about the nature of life cannot constitute the kind of compelling state interests that outweigh
the exercise of fundamental rights. For example, courts should not permit legislatures to
force parents to convert their children to a faith not their own on the grounds that this is
the only way to provide them entry into heaven and everlasting life. The state's interest in
protecting the children's life after death would not be a sufficiently compelling state interest
to justify overriding the parents' and children's free exercise rights. Similarly, courts should
not allow the sacrifice of a woman's autonomy rights to further a state's interest in protecting
potential life before birth on the theory that the conceptus has a soul.
" See, e.g., SUMNER, supra note. 5, at 142-46. Sumner uses sentience, the "capacity for
feeling or affect," as the criterion for moral standing. Id. at 142. He favors this criterion
because a being can acquire it gradually, and because it admits of degrees, assigns no moral
status to plants or inanimate objects, and allows moral standing to be assigned to people with
limited intellectual capabilities, such as the retarded. Id. at 145-46.
Brody argues that a fetus is a human being from the time brain activity begins (at about
six weeks of age). Brain function is the "essence of humanity" under this analysis because its
loss entails that a living human being no longer exists. Baruch Brody, On the Humanity of the
Fetus, in WHAT IS A PERSON?, supra note 16, at 248.
" Professor Hare puts it bluntly:
1 am not saying that physiological research on the fetus has no bearing on moral
questions about abortion. If it [is] brought to light, for example, that fetuses
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determined by mental development, the conceptus is excluded from
this status for a significant part of the gestation period. 56 In short,
without extensive revision and supplementation, the personhood
argument does not support the conservative position.
b. The Potentiality Argument
The potentiality argument rests on premises that parallel those
of the two arguments discussed above. These premises are that
potential persons have moral standing and that the conceptus is a
potential person from the moment of conception. Both of these
premises are susceptible to challenge.
The philosopher Joel Feinberg has argued against the first
premise.57 Although acknowledging that persons have moral stand-
ing, Feinberg argues that it does not follow from this that potential
persons also have moral standing. To reason otherwise is a logical
really do suffer on the same scale as adults do, then that would be a good moral
reason for not causing them to suffer. It would not do to show that they wriggle
when pricked, for so do earthworms; and I do not think that the upholders of
the rights of unborn children wish to extend these rights to earthworms. En-
cephalograms are better; but there are enormous theoretical and practical dif-
ficulties in the argument from encephalograms to conscious experiences. In
default of these latter, which would have to be of such a sort as to distinguish
fetuses radically from other creatures which the antiabortionists would not lift
a finger to protect, the main weight of the antiabortionist argument is likely to
rest, not on the sufferings of the fetus, but on harms done to the interests of
the person into whom the fetus would normally develop.
R.M. Hare, Abortion and the Golden Rule, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 201, 205-06 (1975); see also
Sagan & Druyan, supra note 30, at 6-7 (noting that all animals have the mental ability of the
early fetus to respond to stimuli and move on their own volition, but by the middle of the
seventh month of the gestation period, recognizably human brain activity begins).
36
 Dr. Grobstein hai stated:
[W]ith respect to such 'characteristics as sentience or selfness or consciousness,
correlation with the development of the central nervous system is very close.
We know that it is not until 4 weeks that the first recognizable rudiment of a
nervous system appears, and that at that time there are no identifiable nerve
cells, no identifiable synaptic connections among them, and no identifiable
neurotransmitters.
Through the gradual maturation of the spinal cord, and particularly of the
brain, the underpinnings for properties such as sentience presumably appear.
It is not until 8-10 weeks that there are spontaneous movements in the human
fetus, quickening, of course, not occurring until about 18 weeks. It is not known
whether these early movements represent something that should be interpreted
as sentience or selfness, or whether they are more in the nature of what would
be called unconscious reflex activity.
Human Life Bill, supra note 46, at 457 (statement of Dr. Grobstein).
57 See Joel Feinberg, Potentiality, Development, and Rights, in THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION
supra note 18, at 145-50 (raising "the logical point about potentiality" in order to challenge
the idea that potential persons have a right to life).
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fallacy. "It is a logical error . . . to deduce actual rights from merely
potential (but not yet actual) qualification for those rights." 58 Cer-
tainly, this argument comports with our understanding of legal
rights.59 A thirty-year-old adult has individual constitutional rights
of speech, religion and autonomy; a three-year-old is a potential
adult but does not have this same panoply of rights. 6° This analogy
seems persuasive, unless one can demonstrate that moral status and
legal rights are not the same in this respect. All else being equal,
the potential to qualify for a certain right or status does not itself,
qualify for that right or status.
Feinberg's thesis is correct. It does not follow from the fact that
persons have moral standing that potential persons do as well. His
thesis, however, is also irrelevant. The conservative need not claim
that the conceptus has moral standing because persons have moral
standing. Instead, she can claim that potential personhood itself is
an adequate basis for moral standing. Although the conservative
must defend this claim, it is important to understand that the po-
tentiality argument does not necessarily rest on a non sequitur.
The second premise—that the conceptus is a potential person
from the moment of conception—can also be questioned. One com-
mon objection is that the unfertilized egg and the sperm are also
potential persons, so that by parity of reason they too must have
moral standing. A theory that gives spermatozoa the same moral
status as adult humans seems to prove too much."
58 1d. at 145.
58 Feinberg explains, for example, that as children Jimmy Carter and Franklin Delano
Roosevelt were both potential presidents, yet neither had any claim or right to assume
command of the U.S. military until actually elected to office. Id. at 147-48.
61) While "minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess consti-
tutional rights," Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976), "the power of the
state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults."
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944); see also Carey v. Population Servs. lnt'l,
431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977).
More specifically, the constitutional rights of children are 'more restricted than those of
adults because of the "inability [of minors] to make critical decisions in an informed, mature
manner." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). Thus, the right of a minor to terminate
a pregnancy may be limited by requirements of parental consultation, or, alternatively, a
judicial hearing to determine if the minor is sufficiently mature and informed to make the
decision independently of her parents. Id. at 643-644. Similarly, children do not have the
same First Amendment rights as adults to determine for themselves what they will read.
Minors are "not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presuppo-
sition of First Amendment guarantees." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
61 Sagan and Druyan state:
Every human sperm and egg is, beyond the shadow of a doubt, alive. They are
not human beings, of course. However, it could be argued that neither is a
fertilized egg . . . . A sperm and an unfertilized egg jointly comprise the full
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The conservative has a rejoinder to this criticism. By claiming
that the conceptus is potentially a person, she means that the con-
ceptus is an actually existing single individual with the active poten-
tiality to become a person. Neither the sperm nor the egg are
potentially persons in this sense. A sperm has an active potentiality
to fertilize, an egg to be fertilized; neither has the active potentiality
to become a person. 62
genetic blueprint for a human being. Under certain circumstances, after fertil-
ization, they can develop into a baby. But most fertilized eggs are spontaneously
miscarried. Development into a baby is by no means guaranteed. Neither a
sperm and egg separately, nor a fertilized egg, is more than a potential baby or
a potential adult. So if a sperm and an egg are as human as the fertilized egg
produced by their union, and if it is murder to destroy a fertilized egg—despite
the fact that it's only potentially a baby—why isn't it murder to destroy a sperm
or an egg.
Sagan Sc Druyan, supra note 30, at 5. Grobstein makes the same biological point. "Eggs and
sperm are alive and human, and so, too, is the cell that results from their fusion and all of
its products. Fertilization is not when life begins; it is an important stage in the continuity of
life from generation to generation." Human Life Bill, supra note 96, at 456 (statement of Dr.
Grobstein). Similarly, Sumner argues that if the protection of life is to extend back to fetuses,
embryos or zygotes by virtue of their potential, it must also be extended back by parity of
reasoning to ova and spermatozoa. SUMNER, supra note 5, at 104-05. Moreover:
From the point of view of potentiality, conception . . . is simply another step in
the actualization of the potential for creating a rational being that is contained
in male and female gametes. From the point of view of potentiality, the fact
that conception for the first time assembles the complete genetic material for a
new individual is also of no significance; it is entirely arbitrary to protect a
creature who is potentially rational and to not protect the potential for a rational
creature.
Id. at 105; see also R.G. Edwards, Fertilization of Human Eggs in Vitro: Morals, Ethics and the
Law, 49 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 3,13 (1974) (arguing that unfertilized eggs have the potential for
life because parthenogenesis (the development of an organism from an unfertilized egg) can
occur in mammals). But cf. HURSTHOUSE, supra note 93, at 82 (arguing that parthenogenesis
is not proven to occur in humans, and, even if it were, there are no grounds for asserting
that sperm are potential human beings).
" Hursthouse claims that, under the potentiality view, sperm and unfertilized eggs are
not potential human beings. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 43, at 81-82. Her argument is
complex, but seems to be predicated on two premises. First, in saying that the fetus is a
potential human being or person, Hursthouse does not mean that any specific fetus has the
opportunity to become a human being, an opportunity that may or may not actualize. Rather,
the fetus is a member of a class of potential human beings, regardless of the fate of that
particular fetus. Id. at 80-81. Thus, an ill fetus with no chance to be born alive is as much a
potential human being as a healthy, normal fetus unless "it were, from the start, genetically
so abnormal as to make it impossible that it would even develop to term and survive." Id. at
81 (emphasis added). Thus, the fetus is a potential human being•n the sense that its generic,
natural and normal development is to become a human being.
Second, Hursthouse explains that a sperm and ovum are not generic potential human
beings because each needs "to combine with the other in order for the [developmental]
process to be got going." Id. at 81. A fetus, unlike the ovum and sperm, can develop of its
own accord. Id. at 80. Hursthouse anticipates the objection that this distinction is not crucial
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This response, however, only highlights the need for additional
explanation. Why is it that only actually existing single individuals
constitute potential persons with moral standing while earlier essen-
tial stages of development do .not? The egg in a woman's womb
cannot fulfill its potential without additional intervention (fertiliza-
tion) and substantial change in its condition. But that is clearly true
for a fertilized egg as wel1. 63 The woman's role in the development
and change of the fertilized egg into a delivered baby is an outside,
instrumental necessity. 64 Exactly how do we connect the event of
conception with the reasons why potential persons deserve moral
standing in the first place?
in that the fertilized ovum also must receive substantial external support from its maternal
environment in order for it to develop. Her response to this argument, however, is unclear.
To refute the objection, she argues that the possibility of one thing fortuitously combining
with another to form some new entity does not mean that the constituent parts were poten-
tially the new entity. Id. If an ovum or fetus dies, is buried, decays, and ultimately combines
with a sapling, it would still be incorrect to say that the ovum was a potential tree. Id. The
fertilization of the egg by the sperm, however, involves a natural, normal, and predictable
sequence that is hardly as inconsistent with the idea of normal and natural development as
is the sapling example.
Hursthouse goes on to claim that her theoretical opponent must be arguing either that
sperm and ovum are human beings or that parthenogenesis may occur in humans. Id. at 82.
Her argument here is also difficult to follow, however, and does not seem to counter directly
the point she is challenging. Hursthouse clearly believes that the unfertilized ovum lacks
sufficient characteristics to qualify as a potential human being, but she does not fully explain
why this should be so. Certainly, the ovum is an essential foundation for the development of
human life and its fertilization is part of the natural sequence of events leading to birth.
Although the ovum is, of course, incomplete, that is not inconsistent with a status defined in
terms of potential. The fertilized egg is further developed and significantly more particular-
ized than the ovum,• but its nature still is not conclusively fixed. Much depends on the
receptivity and type of support provided by the mother's body.
Perhaps to Hursthouse, the unfertilized ovum is in some sense a potential, potential
human being. What remains unclear, however, is why that status should be of significantly
lower moral value than that of the conceptus. Given that the development process may be
blocked, and the birth of a baby prevented, by external intervention both pre-conception as
well as post-conception, the case remains to be made why only post-conception decisions
produce morally significant results.
63 See supra note 62.
64 Dr. Rosenberg has stated:
To fulfill [its] potential, the fertilized egg must travel to the uterus, be implanted
in the uterine wall, and undergo millions and millions of cell divisions leading
to the development of its head, skeletal system, limbs, and vital organs. To be
sure, this sequence of events depends on the genetic program present in each
cell of the developing embryo and fetus. As surely, however, the sequence
depends on the environment offered by the mother. Without the genetic blue-
print of the fetal cells, human development cannot be initiated; without the
protection and nutrition provided by the mother's tissues, the genetic blueprint
cannot be followed to completion.
Human Life 13W, supra note 46, at 443-44 (statement of Dr. Leon Rosenberg).
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c. Common Problems
In a superficial sense, the weaknesses of the above arguments
seem to make an excellent case for the liberal position. If all and
only persons have a right to life, for instance, and if the conceptus
is not a person, then it does not have a right to life. Unfortunately
for the liberal, however, under this analysis the same conclusion
may hold for infants. For example, if we adopt strict criteria for
personhood based on mental ability, infants also may not be persons,
and thus would have no right to life. Up to the point when the
child begins to qualify as a person under this analysis, infanticide
should be morally unproblematic. 65
Both the conservative and the liberal at this point may protest
that our definitions of their positions are too rigid and absolute.
The conservative may argue that she does not necessarily contend
that a three-week-old conceptus has the same moral status as an
eight-and-one-half-month-old fetus or a six-year-old child. Her op-
position to legal abortion is justified as long as the moral status of
the conceptus is of sufficient value at each point in time to outweigh
the woman's interest in terminating the pregnancy. That contention
is consistent with the argument that the moral status of the concep-
tus increases throughout the gestation period and, perhaps, there-
after. 66
66
 Michael Tooley is probably the best known proponent of this position. Tooley argues
that a being must be capable of having a desire for something in order to have a right to it.
Therefore, to have a right to life, one must have an interest in continued existence, and, to
have an interest in one's own continued existence, one must possess a concept of self. Tooley,
supra note 16, at 83-114. Carrying this analysis to its logical conclusion, he adds that behav-
ioral and neurophysiological studies indicate that infants do not have the mental capacity to
engage in this kind of conceptual thinking. Accordingly, they do not have a right to life and
"infanticide during a time interval shortly after birth must be viewed as morally acceptable".
Id. at Ill; see also Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and Concept of a Person, in WHAT IS
A PERSON?, supra note 16, at 127-44 (drawing a distinction between ordinary desires and
desires about which desires to have, and arguing that the existence of the latter are essential
to personhood).
Sumner concludes that "[Of being rational is the criterion for moral standing then it
seems to follow that many members of the [human] species have no such standing—and
among these members will be fetuses." SUMNER, supra note 5, at 94. He rejects this criterion,
however, recognizing that under this standard infants and other human beings would lack a
right to life. Id. at 138.
66 See GLOVER, supra note 18, at 127-28. Glover states:
It seems more defensible to abandon the view that there is an abrupt transition
to the status of a person and to replace it by the view that being a person is a
matter of degree. A one-year-old is much more of a person than a newborn
baby or foetus just before birth, but each of these is more of a person than the
embryo.
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The conservative's protest is consistent, but her burden of jus-
tification, not yet adequately satisfied, is now even more onerous.
För an individual with clear moral standing, such as a two-year-old
child, further development and maturation have no impact on her
right to life. Common sense morality does not accord a stronger
right to life to a twenty-year-old than to a two-year-old. Thus, a
more flexible conservative must posit at least a two-tier standard. 67
At conception, the conceptus instantly achieves moral standing suf-
ficient to outweigh the woman's exercise of her right to privacy and
autonomy. That moral status, however, changes during the gesta-
tion period until it culminates at an even higher level of value,
which remains fixed throughout the rest of life. Again, the conser-
vative needs to present a justification for this more complex moral
analysis. If the moral standing of an eight-month-old conceptus or
a five-year-old child differs from the moral standing of a three-
week conceptus, the conservative must justify these distinctions as
well as the absolute priority of the conceptus's over the woman's
interests from the moment of conception through birth.
Similarly, the liberal will reject even the insinuation that she
supports infanticide. Her protest is consistent with her claim that
birth is the critical moral threshold. 68 What the liberal must justify
Id.; see also SUMNER, supra note 5, at 125-26 (arguing that moral standing is acquired gradually
and criticizing viewpoints focusing on the moral importance of conception or birth since
"neither can attach any significance to the development of the fetus during gestation").
Similarly, under what Hursthouse calls the "mixed strategy view," a conceptus' moral status
progresses with development. The conceptus starts out morally akin to a piece of tissue.
Then its moral status increases to that of a lower animal, a higher animal, a baby, and finally
it reaches the status of an adult human being. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 43, at 65.
67 For example, Langerak recognizes that there is a basic tension between the belief that
the fetus has inherent claims to life and the belief that late term abortions are more morally
problematic than early abortions. Langerak, supra note 18, at 252-53, 258-59. To resolve
the dissonance between those two views, Langerak poses a weaker claim to life for the early
fetus supplemented by a conferred claim to life based on avoiding the secondary effects of
late abortions on third parties (that is, society should confer a claim to life on the fetus to
supplement the fetus's inherent claim to life). Id. See generally DEVINE, supra note 43, at 79-
80. Devine warns that those who believe that personhood is acquired gradually must also
determine when "full-fledged humanity" is reached. Otherwise, if the gradualist theory is
extended beyond birth, killing a ten-year•old would be less bad than killing an adult. Id.
" See Lucinda Cisler, Unfinished Business: Birth Control and Women's Liberation, in SISTER-
HOOD IS POWERFUL 274-81 (Robin Morgan ed., 1970) (defending the proposition that birth
is the crucial moral threshold). Cisler's analysis suggests that quickening (the time at which
the mother first perceives fetal movement) and viability (the time at which the fetus can
survive outside the - mother) are too indefinite to be criteria for moral standing. Therefore,
"1wle are left with the inescapable conclusion that the only event in the sequence of pregnancy
that can be assigned a specific time is birth itself, at the time that it occurs. All else is mystique
and conjecture." Id. at 274.
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is her contention that the woman's interest outweighs the right to
life of the about-to-be-delivered conceptus. Further, she must ex-
plain why the woman's interest changes so dramatically from im-
mediately before to immediately after birth.69
The liberal may also seek additional flexibility and concede that
late term abortions indeed may be sufficiently immoral to justify
state-imposed restrictions. 7° This concession, however, requires the
liberal to explain her basis for determining the changing moral
standing of the conceptus, because the separation of the baby from
the mother at birth would no longer be dispositive. in short, the
flexible liberal faces the same difficulty as the flexible conservative:
each must tie the changing condition of the conceptus to an increase
in its moral standing. This difficulty can only be resolved by probing
more deeply into the question of why it is wrong to kill anything
with either the potential for or the actual attributes of personhood.
2. The Wrongfulness of Killing
in conventional moral terms, there are three things wrong with
killing. First, it deprives the individual killed of something that is
usually valuable, the continuation of his or her life. Second, it
deprives the individual of autonomy or self-determination. Finally,
it causes harm to others—for instance, the individual's friends and
family, or the entire community of which he or she is a member.
From the perspective of the conservative, and to the extent that
current law reflects common sense moral intuitions, we can quickly
dispense with the third criterion as reflecting a qualitatively differ-
ent and lesser kind of harm than the first two. As a general matter,
killing a recluse with neither family nor friends remains a morally
" The immediate superficial response to this inquiry is that the woman's interest declines
at birth because the fetus no longer resides within her body. At a short time interval prior
to birth, however, a woman's interest in terminating her pregnancy (special medical compli-
cations aside) rests on two factors: the burden of continuing to carry the fetus for that limited
time period, and the difference between the delivery of a live baby as opposed to a very late
trimester abortion. It is unclear how much weight should be assigned to either factor. See
infra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
7° Hursthouse maintains that under the strict "mixed view" (the view that moral status
is acquired gradually on the basis of development), third trimester abortions are morally
equivalent to infanticide. She adds, however, that many of those who hold the mixed view
try to distinguish late abortions from infanticide on the basis of the fetus's parasitic relation
to the mother prior to birth. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 43, at 66-67; see also SUMNER, supra
note 5, at 151. Using a sentience-based criterion for moral standing, Sumner argues that
"late abortion belongs in the same moral category as infanticide" because, at the time of the
"late" abortion, the fetus has already acquired moral standing. Id.
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reprehensible act of great seriousness." Certainly, it is a much
greater moral wrong than maliciously and falsely informing a per-
son's family that he is dead. Thus, the harm resulting from the
knowledge that someone is dead pales in comparison with the harm
done to the person who is actually killed. Similarly, for the conser-
vative, an abortion performed without the knowledge of any third
party is as morally reprehensible as one that is publicly known to
have occurred. Both actions would constitute murder. Indeed, to
the extreme conservative, devices or methods that prevent implan-
tation are abortifacients and their use is a serious moral wrong, even
though it is highly unlikely that the woman using such methods will
know if and when this event actually occurs." Thus, we may focus
our analysis on the harm suffered by the individual who dies: what
is bad about death for the individual who is killed?"
I See GLOVER, supra note 18, at 40-41.
72 Although "[s]ome abortion opponents . . . oppose forms of contraception that they
believe can work after conception," other pro-life groups reject this contention. Gina Kolata,
Opponents of Louisiana's New Law Say It Could Limit Use of Some Contraceptives, N.Y. Ttmcs, June
21, 1991, at All. The Louisiana Attorney General, however, in discussing that state's new
law criminalizing abortion, "refused to rule out the possibility that doctors could be prose-
cuted for prescribing such contraceptives." Id.
Similarly, RU 486, the so-called "French abortion pill," is condemned by anti-abortionists
because it is a "contra-gestive" rather than a contraceptive, in that it prevents early gestation
rather than conception. In theory, at least, RU 986, if perfected, might allow abortions to be
implemented in private. That possibility has not reduced the moral condemnation the pill
has received from critics. See Dorothy Wickenden, Drug of Choice, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 26,
1990, at 24-26.
"
An important digression must take place at this point in the analysis. Any account of
the sort described in the text relies on one of two kinds of moral theory. Consequenlialist
theories determine the rightness or wrongness of an act by evaluating the consequences of
that act. No act is intrinsically good or bad, that is, good or bad regardless of its consequences.
When the consequences are sufficiently good, the means to achieve them are not merely
permissible, but are morally required. Thus, for example, in defining consequentialist moral
theory, Sumner begins by noting that "a theory is consequentialist just (if] it appraises actions
solely in terms of the value of their consequences"; that is, if it evaluates actions in terms of
their outcomes, not intrinsically, in terms of their nature. SUMNER, supra note 8, at 165.
Sumner adds that consequentialist moral theories utilize principles of the good rather than
of the right." Id. at 167, That is, the goals of the moral framework are understood to be
"valuable or worthwhile, but not obligatory or a matter of right." Id. at 106. Utilitarianism is
the seminal example of a consequentialist moral theory.
By contrast, deontological theories rely on the nature of the act itself, independent of its
consequences. According to such theories, some acts are intrinsically bad, even if they turn
out to have good consequences.
A deontological theory of ethics is one which holds that at least some acts are
morally obligatory regardless of their consequences for human weal or woe
... [If] considerations based on concern for one's own well-being or the well-
being of others indicate a course of action at odds with that dictated by respect
for the moral law, respect for the moral law shOuld prevail.
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a. A Life Worth Living
We noted that one of the things wrong with killing is that it
deprives the individual killed of something valuable. But common
sense morality holds that life itself is not so intrinsically valuable
that its destruction is always immoral. The life of a daisy, for ex-
ample, has little intrinsic value. Certainly killing a daisy is not mor-
Robert G. Olson, Deonfoiogicai Ethics, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 343 (Paul
Edwards ed., 1967).
Thus for the deontologist, the end never justifies the means. That is, moral rules cannot
be broken to accomplish good results. The fact that, on balance, the world would be better
if some action were taken makes it consequentially proper but not deontologically so. For
example, the fact that the organs of an irreversibly comatose patient could be used to benefit
many others may be sufficient to make killing him consequentially right, but it remains
deontologically wrong to kill him under normative rules prohibiting the taking of life, even
if those who could benefit from his organs die as a result.
Pure consequentialism or pure deontology makes for a harsh morality. Anyone with a
knowledge of history can recognize the potential cruelty of utilitarian excesses. Broadly stated
deontological requirements raise different, but equally difficult problems. The deontological
imperative needed to proscribe abortion may be one that completely prohibits killing. If this
imperative is absolute, then it is morally impermissible to kill, even in self-defense, no matter
the consequences. It would be morally impermissible to kill, even when killing is the only
way to avoid a moral horror of the greatest magnitude. Similarly, an absolute deontological
imperative against lying would prohibit lying even when the death of innocent persons would
otherwise result. According to Immanuel Kant, for example, "it is wrong to tell a lie even to
save another man's life," Id.
Considerations of this kind caution against adopting a pure deontological or a pure
consequentialist perspective. They strongly recommend a hybrid view, in which various rules
compete in the moral arena so that we may achieve the best results possible. This hybrid
model tempers the extreme and unacceptable results of pure deontology and avoids the ad
hoc situational uncertainty of consequentialism. Under this framework we can try to identify
general rules that tell us when particular acts of killing are wrong and how wrongful they
are, in terms of the effect of such actions. "Rule utilitarianism" or "rule consequentialism" is
one such hybrid ethical theory that provides that "although any moral rule must be justified
by showing that its adoption has humanly desirable consequences, an act violating a moral
rule cannot itself be morally justified in the same manner." Id.
Sumner proposes a form of rule consequentialism in order to establish a regime of rights
out of a consequentialist moral framework. See SUMNER, supra note 5, at 175-98. H is argument
"is essentially an argument [based on) fallibility":
If you simply set out on each occasion to do the best you can from the limited
information available to you, your imperfect ability to process this information,
your natural bias in favor of yourself and those closely connected with you, the
various pressures to which you are subject in the heat of deliberation—all of
these factors and more will lead you to make costly errors. You are therefore
likely to do better if you precommit yourself to observe some relatively simple
rules even when doing so seems, on the best evidence available to you, to disserve
your basic goal. When looking for such rules our obvious candidate will be the
requirement that you respect those rights whose conventional recognition is the
best social policy for promoting that very goal.
Id, at 195-96.
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ally on a par with killing a person. The two are not morally on a
par because killing the person ends a life that is valuable in a way
that a daisy's life is not. We shall call this valuable form of life a
"life worth living." 74 Unlike life itself, then, a life worth living is
intrinsically valuable: it is valuable in itself and for its own sake, and
not just as a means to, or for the sake of, other things. 75
In discussing the criteria of a life worth living, several points
are crucial. First, whatever the precise components of a life worth
living may be, a life that has not been worth living may become so,
and one that has been worth living may cease to be so. Second,
other things being equal, a longer life worth living is better than a
shorter life worth living. Even the example of the heroic individual
who loses her life in an effort to save others dramatizes this point.
We applaud the self-sacrifice of the heroine, not because of any
belief that her voluntary exposure to death has benefited her own
existence, but because she has given up something of extraordinary
value. Thus, ending or shortening a life worth living harms the
individual who dies, and the more the life is shortened, the greater
the harm to the individual.
Third, for our immediate purposes, it is not necessary to spell
out in detail what makes a life worth living. An adequate account
is undoubtedly variegated and complex, but there will surely be
consensus on some points. We refer to some of these below. 76 What
is critical for our argument, however, is to draw a clear distinction
between the conditions that actually make a life worth living and
the conditions that establish the possibility that a life worth living
might eventually arise.
The analysis we propose rests on a single observation, namely
that there is a certain minimal threshold of physical and mental
74 The concept and discussion of a "life worth living" rely heavily on CLOVER, supra note
18, at 50-57.
75 I t should he clear that any criterion of a life worth living requires an evaluation from
the perspective of humans. Even if a cat, in some attenuated sense, experiences its own life
as valuable and worth living, it is by no means clear that people would regard an existence
with the consciousness and capabilities of a cat as a life worth living. The issue becomes even
more blatantly problematic if one considers the condition of life of a zygote. See infra notes
81-82,88. The assumption here is that
human beings—or nearly all of them—are capable of a much richer kind of life
than nonhuman animals on this planet enjoy, including the very moral agency
presupposed in the asking of a moral question. To be deprived of this kind of
life (or to have it impaired) is a much greater harm than to be deprived of a
merely animal existence.
DEVINE, supra note 43, at 49.
'6 See infra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
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capability necessary to establish a life worth living. Below this thresh-
old, there is no life worth living in our special, morally-laden sense.
Although a daisy falls below this threshold, essentially no child or
adult does. Thus, from this perspective, the argument that an un-
wanted child of limited economic means, or a child born with
Down's syndrome, does not enjoy a life worth living is not simply
erroneous, it is absurd.
Even this minimum threshold, however, poses a critical prob-
lem for the conservative position. The conservative must assert the
unsupportable contention that a four-week conceptus, an embryo
less than an inch long, without even rudimentary consciousness,
actually has a life worth living. 77 If she does not, she must concede
that the conceptus lacks moral standing at the moment of concep-
tion. Alternatively, she must attempt to justify the moral standing
of the conceptus not in terms of its current condition but through
its potentiality, through the likelihood that it may develop into a
child with an unmistakable life worth living. We address this latter
argument following the next subsection.
b. Autonomy
Apart from being wrong when it deprives an individual of a
life worth living, killing is wrong if it subverts the individual's au-
tonomy. In most killings, the individual is harmed in two ways: her
autonomy is violated, and she loses a life worth living. In some
cases, however, the only harm suffered is loss of self-determination.
For example, imagine that someone has frequently and unequivo-
cally declared that she wishes to remain alive for as long as possible,
even if she is permanently unconscious. She then becomes perma-
nently unconscious. Even those who agree that a life under such
conditions is not worth living nonetheless may acknowledge a sense
in which killing her would be wrong. 78
77
 According to the testimony of Dr. James Neal:
Approximately 30 days after conception, the developing embryo has a series of
parallel ridges and grooves in its neck that are interpreted as corresponding to
the gill slits and gill arches of fish. At that same time, it has a caudal appendage
that is quite simply labeled "tail" in many textbooks of human embryology .
The early embryo appears to pass through some of the stages in the evolutionary
history of our species .... fThis means that] during embryological development
we repeat in abbreviated form many aspects of our evolutionary past. [Thus]
the potentiality for becoming a human being is clearly present from the moment
of conception, but to judge by external appearance, that potentiality is not
immediately realized.
Human Life Bill, supra note 46, at 458 (statement of Dr. James Neal).
" Glover explains that the principle requiring respect for the individual's autonomy with
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This is an especially difficult example. For a less difficult case,
imagine an individual whose life some third person would not con-
sider worth living, but who continues to want to live. It is always
possible to be unsure about a third person's judgments concerning
another's life. That other may be disfigured, abandoned, unem-
ployed and unemployable, paralyzed, in constant pain, and with no
prospects for a better future. But his life may still have purpose
and his days may include moments of bliss. This sort of uncertainty
plays a large role in our deference to his judgment. But a deeper
reason underlies our reluctance to supersede his evaluation. It is
his life we are judging. What matters ultimately are his priorities
and values, priorities and values of which we may approve or dis-
approve, but which we have no right to dismiss.
The intuitive moral value we place on an individual's self-
determination extends beyond the question of continued existence.
It is reflected in the legal arena in the constitutional doctrine that
protects a woman's procreational decisions from state intervention.
The right of personal autonomy recognized in the Supreme Court's
privacy cases is grounded on the moral indignity of ignoring an
individual's fundamental decisions about his or her own life. 79
3. The Morality of Killing and Abortion
As discussed above, killing is a moral wrong when it destroys a
life worth living or when it violates the personal autonomy of the
individual. To what extent is abortion a wrong of this kind? The
regard to life and death decisions can be defended under both a deontological and a
utilitarian moral framework. The utilitarian analysis is based "partly on the bad side-effects
of 'paternalistic killing,' partly on the fallibility of predictions about people's future happiness
or misery and partly on the central role that a person's own view of his life must play in any
decision whether his life is worth living." GLOVER, supra note 18, at 78. Accordingly, to Glover,
"[e]xcept in the most extreme circumstances, it is directly wrong to kill someone who wants
to go on living, even if there is reason to think this desire [is] not in his own interests." Id.
at 83.
Hursthouse criticizes this autonomy principle in part because it does not preclude the
utilitarian sacrifice of' one person to save a larger group. In other words, autonomy may be
too easily outweighed. HuitsmousE, supra note 43, at 158-65. She also challenges Glover's
assumption that autonomy rights only accrue to an entity that wants to go on living, which
requires a state of mental awareness that the fetus and infant will lack. Id. at 163-64.
Nonetheless, at a minimum, a serious commitment to an autonomy principle provides some
measure of protection against the abuses of utilitarianism in many important circumstances,
even if it does not temper utilitarianism sufficiently to meet Hursthouse's objections.
" See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841,2883-85 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (locating a dying person's constitutional right to be free from unwanted medical
treatment within a more generalized right of bodily integrity, self-determination and privacy,
which includes procreational choices).
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autonomy argument does not directly support the wrongfulness of
abortion. It makes little sense to ascribe autonomy rights to some-
thing that is not autonomous. Autonomy rights are properly as-
cribed only to those who are capable of having, rejecting or en-
dorsing preferences and values, choosing among alternatives, and
planning and making decisions. Such rights are not properly as-
cribed to those who lack these capacities. Thus, they are not ascribed
to the conceptus, or arguably, even to the newborn child. Even if
some very limited right of autonomy is attributable to the conceptus,
surely it is analytically distinct from and of a substantially lesser
value than that which we assign to a more developed human being. 8°
The issue of a life worth living is more difficult to address. The
status of the conceptus at any point during gestation is difficult to
evaluate. In particular, it is not a simple matter to determine exactly
what kind of sentience or consciousness exists at any given stage of
development. Even when consciousness of some sort exists, what
are its characteristics? To defend abortion rights by focusing on a
life worth living, we must establish that for some significant part of
the gestation period, the actual condition of the conceptus, without
regard to its potential for development, is qualitatively different
from that of a child. During the early weeks of pregnancy, we can
be certain that the conceptus lacks consciousness of any sort. We
can be far less certain of its condition during the last trimester.'"
Despite this uncertainty, the foregoing analysis of the immor-
ality of killing establishes certain things. It shows that there is a
qualitative moral difference between early abortion and killing an
infant or adult. It also strongly suggests that the moral standing of
the conceptus increases during gestation. Its potential aside, how-
ever, the life of a zygote is not actually a life worth living. Thus,
from the moment of conception, whatever moral status the concep-
tus has is grounded not in its actual state, but in its potential, at
least, that is, until its development progresses to the point at which
it experiences a life worth living or becomes autonomous. This view
is consistent with, and indeed helps explain, the moral intuition that
80 See supra note 78.
"' Although the fetus shows some reflex movements by the end of the eighth week of
the gestation period, the linkage of neurons in the cerebral cortex does not begin until the
24th week. Brain waves with patterns similar to those of adult human beings do not begin
until the 30th week. Thus, "Rjhe beginning of characteristically human thinking becomes
barely possible" at the start of the third trimester. Sagan & Druyan, supra note 30, at 7. See
also infra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
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an abortion in the eighth month of pregnancy is a far greater moral
wrong than an abortion in the first month of pregnancy. 82
a. The Value of Potential Life
Distilling the conservative position to one that is predicated on
the moral sanctity of potential life does not settle the issue. It does
not automatically justify a permissive regulatory environment in
which the decision to have an abortion may be made at the woman's
discretion, even during early pregnancy. For although the possibility
of experiencing a life worth living is not the same thing as having
such a life, it is still of moral value. Thus, we cannot determine the
moral significance of abortion solely by considering the actual status
of the conceptus at the time an abortion occurs. We also must
consider what the conceptus may eventually become. Whether one
uses the terminology of potential life, potential person or potential
baby, there is no doubt that what we are discussing exists on a
developmental continuum that itself is of substantial moral value.
The argument that the conceptus is entitled to protection be-
cause it can become a baby lacks the rhetorical passion of the tradi-
tional conservative position. Nonetheless, it is an analytically pow-
erful position. If it is immoral to terminate a pregnancy at that point
in the gestation period when the conceptus can be said to enjoy a
life worth living, surely it is almost as immoral to terminate a preg-
nancy one moment before that potential is actualized. This regres-
sion can be pursued back to conception itself. Thus, the conceptus
has the potential to develop naturally into a newborn. The conser-
vative may argue that it is this capacity to become that gives the
conceptus moral standing, and that it is the irrevocable denial of
that potential that makes abortion wrong.
This modified conservative argument is correct in an important
sense. Abortion of a healthy conceptus with good prospects for a
82 As noted, to avoid this conclusion, the strict conservative, because she insists that the
conceptus, at conception, is a person with clear moral standing in its own right, must posit
the existence of classes of persons based on their maturation and abilities, assigning greater
moral value to the more capable group. That contention, however, runs counter to the
general moral intuition that the murder of a newborn infant and a one-year-old are com-
parable moral events, despite the substantially greater relative maturity and abilities of the
one-year-old. Without positing such distinct classes, however, the conservative cannot justify
the increased wrongfulness of late term abortions. Indeed, if personhood and full moral
standing are achieved at conception, in a purely logical sense, apart from its side effects, the
late abortion would have to be the morally preferable course, because all things being equal,
more life is better than less.
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life worth living is prima facie wrong. But it is important to under-
stand precisely in what sense it is wrong. The death of the conceptus
preempts the possibility of a worthwhile life. It denies life oppor-
tunities. It does not nullify the current and ongoing experience of
a life worth living. Early in the pregnancy, at least, the conceptus is
not yet capable of that experience. An abortion is not prima facie
wrong because it frustrates or overrules the conceptus's ambitions,
objectives or aspirations. It is wrong because it makes such things
impossible. Abortion is wrong to the extent that it eliminates the
possibility of a new, full-fledged life with its own projects, experi-
ences and plans.
But this is precisely the effect of contraception, or, for that
matter, of celibacy. The decision not to conceive, whether by ab-
staining from intercourse or by preventing fertilization in some
other way, also denies life opportunities. Where conception would
produce a conceptus that ultimately would have a life worth living,
contraception is morally comparable to abortion. Each prevents a
life worth living from coming into being and from developing.
The potentiality argument does not begin to apply at concep-
tion. if one traces the developmental continuum that leads to the
birth of a child, it is apparent that significant events occur prior to
conception. An obvious example is the decision of the mother and
father to have a child." Moreover, whatever moral status we assign
to pre-conception potential life on this developmental continuum,
it is clearly outweighed by the autonomy rights of the prospective
parents to determine whether or not they wish to have children.
Using the same moment-by-moment analysis employed by the con-
servative to establish the value of potential life, the liberal may argue
that because pre-conception potential life is subordinate to the par-
ents' autonomy choices one minute prior to conception, the same
balance of personal freedom and the state's interests should apply
minutes later when fertilization of the egg occurs."
The conservative will insist that there is nonetheless a funda-
mental moral difference between contraception and abortion.
Strictly speaking, only abortion kills. Contraception merely prevents
" In romantic terms, of course, the developmental continuum can be said to begin with
even earlier decisions. In the words of Lennart Nilsson, whose sensational microphotography
of the fertilization and gestation process was published in Life Magazine, "(mlaybe the first
moment of human life, it starts with a kiss." David Van Biema, Master of an 'Unbelievable
Invisible World, LIFE MAGAZINE, Aug. 1990, at 46.
84 See, e.g., Langerak, supra note 18, at 252 (discussing the difficulties inherent in iden-
tifying one "magic moment" in which the conceptus immediately develops a claim to life).
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a new life from forming. As the foregoing analysis helps make clear,
however, early abortions are not morally objectionable because they
kill. They are morally objectionable because they prevent lives worth
living from developing. 85
We can reaffirm this judgment by returning to the hypothetical,
previously discussed, involving the pregnant woman carrying a con-
ceptus of five weeks that will never mature to birth. A miscarriage
will occur between the fourth and fifth month of the gestation
period. Assume further that if nature is allowed to take its course
without medical intervention, the woman will never be able to bear
children. If the nondeveloping conceptus is aborted early in the
gestation period, however, the woman will be able to conceive again
and bear a normal healthy child. Is abortion morally justified in this
situation? If it is, the key element of the moral standing of the
conceptus through a significant part of the gestation period is not
the life the conceptus experiences but rather its developmental poten-
tial to become a newborn baby. When that potential is eliminated
from one side of the moral equation, the potential life of children
not yet conceived has moral value at least equal to that of the conceptus
without developmental potentia1. 88
The point is not that potential life before conception is always
equivalent to potential life after conception. While many concep-
tions terminate in spontaneous miscarriages, 87 development into a
newborn becomes increasingly probable as the pregnancy pro-
gresses. Hypotheticals involving predictable and certain miscar-
°5 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
86 Although the conceptus in our example is alive, the fact that it has no development
possibilities makes killing it a morally distinct event from the killing of a child. This basic
distinction holds true even if we assume similar tragic conditions involving the child. If a
three-year-old boy has only six months to live, our moral intuitions do not justify ending the
child's life immediately, even if doing so would provide vital organs that could be used to
save the life of another child. The moral status of the three-year-old is grounded on its actual
condition in a way that the moral status of the conceptus is not. This moral judgment, that
a person's bodily integrity and life cannot be sacrificed to aid others even if the individual is
terminally ill and has virtually no future prospects, is reflected in the case law, For example,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided en bane that it was error for a trial court
to order a terminally ill pregnant woman to submit to a caesarean section that would hasten
her death in order to increase the likelihood that the fetus that she was carrying would
survive. See In re A.G., 573 A.2d 1235,1252-53 (D.C. 1990). "Mt matters not what the quality
of a patient's life may be; the right of bodily integrity is not extinguished simply because
someone is ill, or even at death's door." Id. at 1247.
87 For example, "[e]mbryologists estimate that as many as two-thirds of all fertilized ova
fail to implant and are carried out in the woman's next menstrual flow." HYMAN RODMAN ET
AL., THE ABORTION QUESTION 50 (1987). Spontaneous abortions or miscarriages terminate
about one-third of all pregnancies. Id. at 33.
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riages describe extraordinary, not routine, circumstances. The pur-
pose of the hypothetical is not to describe what will ordinarily occur
but to confirm that the moral value of developing life, pre- and
post-conception, is in its potential, not its actual condition." In terms
of potential life, conception is simply one point on a continuum
without any more significance than other essential developmental
events. 89
This analysis is also consistent with common sense morality.
Consider a married couple trying to decide whether or not to have
children. They agree not to have children. Their next choice is the
means of contraception they will employ. They consider abstinence,
condoms and a device that prevents the implantation of the zygote
in the uterine wall after conception occurs. In terms of the effect
on potential life that this couple controls, can it really be that the
decision not to conceive is devoid of moral significance while the
choice among the three methods is equivalent to deciding whether
or not to commit premeditated murder? 9° In real terms, is the latter
decision the more critical one for the life to be, or is it at best
incidental to the crucial judgment of the couple that they do not
want to have a baby?
Recognition of the moral proximity of contraception and early
abortion does not mean that abortion is morally inconsequential.
Under the analysis we propose, it means that contraception is a
morally serious act. The decision to conceive is an act of transcen-
" Consider another hypothetical. Assume that a pregnant woman takes a drug whose
effect is to freeze the conceptus permanently at a very early stage of development. Once the
drug is administered, its effect on the conceptus is absolutely irreversible. It is difficult to
see what harm could be done to the conceptus by abortion that is not done by such a drug.
It is even more difficult to see what harm could be done by administering this drug that is
not done by contraception. The net moral effect of all three is the same: a life worth living
is prevented. Preventing the new • life by contraception is not materially different from
preventing it by arresting development at an early stage; this is not materially different from
preventing it by aborting. Thus, from the moral point of view, early abortion and contracep-
tion, although not equivalent, are at least sufficiently close that any distinction between the
two cannot justify abridging fundamental tights in one circumstance and not the other.
89 See, e.g., Human Life Bill, supra note 46, at 457 (statement of Dr. Grobstein) ("At still
later stages [of development] our knowledge indicates that there is continuing transition and
emergence of properties normally associated with self or personhood over a considerable
period of time."); RODMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 35 (noting various points of development
during the gestation period including "conception, implantation, quickening, viability, or
some degree of brain function deemed uniquely human" as possible determinants of per-
sonhood).
See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 34, at 122. ("Both the IUD and some birth control pills
may work to prevent pregnancy not by preventing conception but by preventing a newly
fertilized ovum from implanting in the wall of the uterus.").
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dent moral value. For the same reasons and in the same manner,
the decision not to conceive is, profoundly, a morally significant
decision. When conception would lead to a new life worth living,
the decision to conceive is prima facie a morally commendable
decision. When conception would lead to a new life worth living,
the decision never to conceive is prima facie morally problematic."
In the majority of cases, other factors will radically change the
moral tone of either abortion or contraception: the interests and
needs of the woman, her spouse, her family and circle of intimates
are factors that may change the moral balance substantially. The
effects of pregnancy on her health and of child-rearing on the
conduct of her life are factors as well. We do not say that the decision
not to conceive is always immoral. We claim only that it is always
morally significant, and morally significant in essentially the same
way as the decision to abort early in one's pregnancy.
Put simply, conception benefits someone and contraception
harms someone. When a child conceived would have a life worth
living, conception benefits it, and contraception harms it. This is
exactly the effect of abortion. When the conceptus would have a
life worth living, not having an abortion benefits it. Under the same
circumstances, an abortion harms it. Moreover, an abortion harms
it in precisely the same way as contraception does. An unconceived
and an aborted conceptus are denied the same life opportunities.
From the perspective of the conceptus, it suffers no greater wrong
in being aborted than in not being conceived.
A final example further demonstrates the importance of attri-
buting moral significance to pre-conception decisions. It is well
documented that women over the age of forty run an increased
risk of having children severely impaired by genetic defects. 92 Sup-
pose one hundred women in that age group consider becoming
pregnant. Assume further that the risk of having an impaired child
is one in one hundred for women in this age group. Moreover,
none of these particular women is willing to incur that risk unless
abortion is an available alternative." Accordingly, if abortion is an
51 Some abortion opponents recognize the moral parallels between contraception and
abortion, although not necessarily for the reasons argued in the text. To some Catholic
theologians, for example, contraception is "analogous to homicide." See Sylvia A. Law, Re-
thinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1025 n.248 (1984).
52 See Doug Podo'sky, Having Babies Past 40, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 29, 1990,
at 105 ("The risk of Down['s] Syndrome soars . . . from 1 in 378 births at age 35 to 1 in 106
at age 40."). See generally CAROLE MCCAULEY, PREGNANCY AFTER 35, at 45-46 (1976).
53 We do not suggest that this is a common attitude of women of this age, merely that it
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available option, many, perhaps all, of the one hundred women will
conceive, but there is a strong probability that one woman will have
an abortion. If abortion is not available, none of these women will
elect to become pregnant. As this example makes clear, the potential
lives prevented from coming into being by prohibiting abortion also
belong in our moral evaluation of whether abortion should be per-
mitted.
One must be careful here to distinguish this hypothetical from
the more common ethical dilemma of sacrificing the one to save the
many. In our hypothetical, it is true that if abortions are permitted,
one conceptus is likely to be destroyed. In the alternative state where
abortion is prohibited, however, none of the conceptuses, including
that one, would have come into being. From the perspective of that
conceptus, is that a morally superior outcome? Is total nonexistence,
in the sense of not being conceived, so preferable morally in com-
parison to the short-term existence that occurs in a terminated
pregnancy that it outweighs the loss of the ninety-nine children who
would otherwise be born, but never are? Is determined nonexist-
ence a better condition than deliberately determined short-term
existence?
All of these arguments and hypotheticals support the same
general conclusion: the state's moral interest in protecting potential
life is not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify interference
with the woman's privacy and autonomy rights through a significant
part of the gestation period. There is a basic moral equivalence
between the decision not to conceive and the decision to have an
early abortion. Because the woman's privacy and autonomy rights
clearly prevent the state from controlling her choice as to whether
or not she will become pregnant, these same rights also prohibit the
state from restricting, on moral grounds, her decision to have an
early abortion.
b. The Conservative.Rejoinder
Conservatives can challenge the thesis that abortion and con-
traception have a comparable moral status, at least through the
beginning of the gestation period, on several fronts. One charge
we must face is that. the thesis commits us to an absurd ontology,
or concept of being. There is no life prior to conception that can
is a plausible hypothesis for at least some women. This issue arises in a more agonizing form
for women carriers of Tay Sachs and similar hereditary conditions.
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be harmed by a decision not to conceive. It makes no sense to talk
about harm to a possible but unreal being. Only after conception
can one meaningfully discuss harm to a developing entity that even-
tually will become a person."
94 See, e.g., Michael D. Bayles, Harm to the Unconceived, 5 Pun.. & Pus. AFF. 293 (1976).
Bayles argues that the two necessary conditions for private harm to exist are first, an existing
individual person, and second, conduct that "unreasonably risks adversely affecting or does
adversely affect another person's net interests." Id. at 293. With regard to the unconceived,
he claims:
the two standard conditions for the application of the harm principle are not
obviously met with respect to those people to be protected who do not now
exist. Since they do not exist, how can one identify individual persons who may
be harmed? Moreover, how can one harm nonexistent persons, make them
worse off? Nonexistent persons do not have any interests which may be ad-
versely affected.
Id. at 294. Accordingly, he rejects the idea that one can harm individual persons by not
conceiving them and bringing about their existence. Id. at 298-99.
Bayles's analysis is predicated on two uncertain premises. First, he recognizes that the
unconceived can receive benefits (being brought into existence), but distinguishes between
the failure to provide a benefit and causing a harm. Id. at 298. By analogizing conception to
the granting of a nonobligatory gift, he concludes that the failure to conceive at worst involves
the deprivation of a benefit. Id. The difficulty with this argument, as it relates to the morality
of abortion, is that it provides no basis for determining when the benefit or gift of life is
completed, so that its withdrawal constitutes a harm. If, before conception, a woman uses a
contraceptive device that prevents implantation or otherwise causes a miscarriage, has the
conceptus been harmed? Alternatively, did it receive a much more limited benefit from its
creator than would otherwise have been the case? Without some way of determining when
the "gift of creation" is completed, the distinction between depriving someone of a benefit
and inflicting harm upon him is of limited usefulness.
Second, Bayles argues that nonexistent persons, including the unconceived, "cannot be
individuated." Id. at 299. Therefore, they cannot be the victims of private harm. In response
to the contention that the failure to conceive would harm the person who would be born if
two particular people engaged in intercourse five minutes from now, Bayles suggests that
this description is insufficiently precise to designate anyone in particular. Id. This conclusion
is also dubious. If Bayles's concern is that conception may not occur at all as a result of any
specific sexual interaction, his objection may be mitigated by stipulating the two designated
people are fertile and that, given sufficient opportunities, the probability of conception will
be extremely high. The same result follows if Bayles were to argue that the exact individual
conceived depends on which particular sperm joins with the ovum. The inability to predict
or describe which person will suffer the harm does not undermine the legal determination,
at least, that an individual being will be harmed by a perpetrator's behavior. Placing a land
mine on the sidewalk on Fifth Avenue is attempted murder, regardless of the indeterminate
identity of the victim. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 619-
20 (2d ed. 1986).
The following hypothetical helps illustrate the point. Assume A irrevocably gives a car
to a lottery company. The lottery company will pick a single winner out of one billion entrants;
just as in Bayles's hypothetical, which individual wins the car depends on which particular
number is chosen. If B destroys the car five minutes before the lottery is to take place, can
it be argued that no one person was harmed by B's action and that only the general public
suffered a loss? Would it not be more accurate to contend that the individual who would be
picked in the future has been harmed by B's conduct? Certainly, if the lottery takes place
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There are several ways to respond to this attack. The least
controversial is to note that the thesis that contraception and abor-
tion are morally comparable can be defended without any essential
reference to individuals who are real prior to conception. The thesis
requires only that when a woman conceives, she conceives someone.
The morally central points can be made by looking at life oppor-
tunities in general. Contraception does not end a life worth living;
neither does early abortion. Contraception precludes life opportu-
nities and preempts a possible life worth living; abortion does the
same. One can see the equivalence between the two without thinking
that there is, prior to conception, a particular individual whose life
opportunities would be precluded by contraception or ended by
abortion. The thesis that contraception and abortion are morally
similar is ontologically neutral.
This can also be seen by directly examining the morality of an
act of abortion. A real conceptus is going to be destroyed. As to this
particularized concrete being we may ask whether the woman who
does not want to be pregnant is committing a greater moral wrong
by conceiving this conceptus and terminating it rather than having
prevented its conception in the first place? Is this conceptus worse
off in having been given a limited existence as opposed to none at
all?95
This is not an incoherent metaphysical inquiry. Indeed, this
inquiry is strongly suggested not only by common sense moral
understanding but by legal intuitions as well. Consider one line of
wrongful life cases.96 A married couple bears a child with a serious
anyway because the officials had not learned in time that the prize had been destroyed, the
winner is clearly harmed by B's actions.
9' Obviously, in all cases in which an abortion is performed conception has already
occurred. The mother had the right to avoid conception but, for a variety of possible reasons,
did not accomplish that result. Accordingly, whenever an abortion is performed, there is
always a being in existence that may be wrongfully harmed by the abortion, and there is
always a being in existence that would not have been in existence, or at least not in its current
state of existence, if it had not been conceived. The inquiry we propose examines whether
aborting the fetus harms it in a significantly more egregious way by denying its subsequent
existence than by preventing its conception in the first place. Presumably, the individual born
to parents who did not want him views his parents' failure to avoid his conception and their
unwillingness to abort as entirely commensurate events.
"See, e.g., Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 852 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1988); Turpin v. Sortini,
643 P.2d 954, 955 (Cal. 1982) ("child born with an hereditary affliction" brought wrongful
life action against "a medical care. provider who—before the child's conception—negligently
failed to advise the child's parents of the possibility of the hereditary condition, depriving
them of the opportunity to choose not to conceive the child"); Lininger ex rd. Lininger v.
Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Colo. 1988) (parents conceived second child in reliance on
physician's erroneous advice that blindness of first child was nonhereditary); Moores v. Lucas,
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impairment, and they seek medical counseling to determine the
cause of their child's condition. Their physician's diagnosis negli-
gently fails to disclose that the cause of their child's impairment is
a genetic defect that will affect any future children the couple may
have. Relying on this erroneous information, the parents conceive
again and another infirm child is born. The correct genetic diag-
nosis is now made. The parents indicate that they never would have
conceived the second child if they had received accurate informa-
tion after the first child was born as to the hereditary traits they
carried. A wrongful life action is brought by the second child. The
child alleges that she would have been better off not being brought
into existence, rather than having to live in her present impaired
condition.
Although they reflect different perspectives, wrongful life cases
of this kind share a common foundation with arguments relating
to the morality of abortion and contraception. In the wrongful life
case, the parents' decision not to conceive the fetus would have
resulted in nonexistence for the child plaintiff, who claims that such
a state is preferable to her present impaired condition. Thus, the
child argues that the defendant's conduct in influencing her parents
to conceive a child caused her harm.'''' If that argument is intelli-
gible, however, and it is meaningful to claim that a child born with
severe birth defects was harmed by being conceived, 98 then surely
it is equally plausible to suggest that a healthy child would have
405 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (parents with genetic disorder would not
have conceived child if properly informed that condition was inheritable); Bruggeman ex rel.
Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 635, 636-37 (Kan. 1986) (after birth of first child with
serious birth defects, parents would not have elected to have additional children but for
defendant's inadequate and negligent genetic counseling); Dorlin v. Providence Hosp., 325
N.W.2d 600, 601 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (child born with sickle cell anemia would not have
been conceived if mother had been adequately informed of consequences of genetic disor-
der); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 486 (Wash. 1983) (en bane) (parents would
not have conceived additional children if adequately informed of risks of birth defects caused
by drug administered to mother).
t'7 "[M]ost courts and commentators have recognized that the basic claim of 'injury' in
wrongful life cases is '[i]n essence . . . that [defendants], through their negligence, [have]
forced upon [the child] the worst of . . . two alternatives[,] ... that nonexistence—never
being born—would have, been preferable to existence in [the] diseased state. — Turpin, 643
P:2d at 961 (quoting Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 511-512 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (Spaeth,
J., concurring and dissenting), aff'd in part, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981)).
" See Procanik ex rel. Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 770 (N.J. 1984) (Handler, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The proposition that nonexistence can be chosen
over existence, though philosophically remarkable, is not judicially indefensible or unprec-
edented.").
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been harmed by preventing its conception. 99
 In both circumstances,
the inquiry requires a comparison between the nonexistence that
results from avoided conception and the current condition of the
child who argues that preventing conception would have either
harmed or benefited it.'w
Wrongful life cases suggest that, in theory, we can evaluate
both conception and contraception as to their beneficial or harmful
consequences for children-to-be. They also support the intuition
that preventing conception denies life opportunities in much the
" Hare recognizes the "perplexing" nature of this claim but nonetheless seeks to
cast doubt on the assumption ... that one cannot harm a person by preventing
him coming into existence. True, he does not exist to be harmed; and he is not
deprived of existence, in the sense of having it taken away from him, though he
is denied it. But if it would have been a good for him to exist (because this made
possible the goods that, once he existed, he was able to enjoy), surely it was a
harm to him not to exist, and so not to be able to enjoy these goods. He did
not suffer; but there were enjoyments he could have had and did not.
Hare, supra note 55, at 221. For Bayles's criticism of this position, see supra note 93.
loo Indeed, some courts explicitly refer to potential persons being harmed by the defen-
dant's negligence prior to conception. See, e.g., Turpin, 643 P.2d at 962 ("When a defendant
negligently fails to diagnose an hereditary ailment, he harms the potential child as well as
the parents by depriving the parents of information which may be necessary to determine
whether it is in the child's own interest to be born with defects or not to be born at all.");
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 495-96 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (physician's
duty to inform mother of risks associated with prescribed drug during future pregnancies
extends to "unconceived children" who may bring wrongful life action after birth); see also
Cowe ex re/. Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc. 541 N.E.2d 962, 968 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (Conover,
J., concurring). The Cowe concurrence stated:
[A]ny person who is the direct result of a sexual union which occurs without
the knowing and intelligent consent of both parents, whether that union was
due to violence (i.e., rape, incest, child molesting, etc.) or otherwise, has an
unqualified right not to be born under such circumstances which pre-exist
conception.
Cowe ex rel. Cowe, 541 N.E.2d at 968; see also Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 512 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1979) (Spaeth, J., concurring and dissenting) ("If it were possible to approach a
being before its conception and ask it whether it would prefer to live in an impaired state,
or not to live at all, none of us can imagine what the answer would be."), aff'd in part, 439
A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981).
Other courts criticize such ideas as hopelessly metaphysical or simply meaningless. See
Lininger ex rel. Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1210 (Colo. 1988) (courts "cannot
appraise the value of [plaintiff's] nonexistence for purposes of comparing it with his impaired
existence" because "the relevant question—of what value to [plaintiff) would his nonexistence
have been?—is entirely too metaphysical to be understood within the confines of law, if
indeed, the question has any meaning at all"); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 13 (Mass.
1990) (denying wrongful life claim based on negligent pre-conception genetic counseling on
grounds that "[o]n a theoretical basis, it is difficult to conclude that the defendant physician
was in breach of any duty to [plaintiff]"); Speck, 408 A.2d at 508 ("Whether it is better to
have never been born at all rather than to have been born with serious mental defects is a
mystery more properly left to the philosophers and theologians, a mystery which would lead
us into the field of metaphysics, beyond the realm of our understanding or ability to solve.").
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same way that abortion does. Courts confronted with a wrongful
life action, based on allegations that the child plaintiff would not
have been conceived but for the defendant's negligence, do not
distinguish it in theory from a wrongful life action in which the
parents claim they would have had an abortion rather than give
birth to a severely impaired baby."' In both contexts, courts struggle
with the same question of whether a wrongful life action should be
allowed.
The cases are difficult to resolve, but their difficulty arises out
of two specific concerns. First, courts are unsure how to value
nonexistence—the allegedly preferred status of which the child has
been deprived—in comparison to the child's impaired existence.
There is an intractable problem of measuring the loss the child
allegedly suffers as a result of being born. 102 Second, judges are
'°' Opinions in wrongful life cases, whether they recognize the cause of action or not,
routinely and interchangeably cite as precedent cases involving allegations that parents would
not have conceived additional children but for the defendant's negligence and cases in which
the parents would have had an abortion rather than give birth to a child with birth defects.
The exact same arguments are used in both cases without any judicial suggestion that one
fact pattern is a more, or less, intelligible or reasonable basis for the cause of action than the
other. See, e.g., Dorlin v. Providence Hosp., 325 N.W.2d 600, 601-02 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)
(decision in wrongful life case involving mother who would not have conceived child but for
defendant's negligence decided on basis of prior authority involving mother who would have
aborted fetus). Compare Turpin, 643 P.2d at 955 (parents would not have conceived the
plaintiff child but for the defendant's negligence) and Lininger, 764 P.2d at 1204 (same) and
Bruggeman ex rel. Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 635, 636-37 (Kan. 1986) (same) with
Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (parents claimed they would
have aborted the fetus if they had received accurate medical information) and Procanik ex
rel. Procanik v. Cilb, 478 A.2d 755, 758 (N.J. 1984) (same) and Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d
918, 919 (Tex. 1984) (same).
In some cases, plaintiffs claimed both that they would not have been conceived, and,
alternatively, that they would have been aborted, but for the negligence of defendants. See,
e.g., Speck, 408 A.2d at 500; Rubin ex rel. Rubin v. Hamot Medical Ctr., 478 A.2d 869, 870
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); see also Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 808-09 (N.Y. 1978) (single
opinion resolving two cases, one involving the conception of a child after negligent genetic
counseling, the other involving a child with Down's syndrome who would have been aborted).
In these cases the courts also drew no distinction between these two grounds for wrongful
life claims.
At least one state, Indiana, has enacted legislation declaring, "No person shall maintain
a cause of action or receive an award of damages on his behalf based on the claim that but
for the negligent conduct of another he would have been aborted.r IND. CODE ANN. § 34—
1-1-11 (West Supp. 1991). In a case applying that statement to a wrongful life action alleging
that the plaintiff would not have been conceived but for the defendant's negligence, the
majority sustained the plaintiff's claim on the grounds that it was not technically covered by
the terms of the statute. Cowe, 541 N.E.2d at 965. The majority's conclusion was challenged
in dissent on the grounds that the thrust of plaintiff's claim was that he would have been
better off not being born, a view that "is contrary to the public policy of this state as declared
. . . in Indiana Code section 34-1-1-11." Id. at 971 (Ratliff, C.J., dissenting).
104 See, e,g., Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 322 (Idaho 1984) (noting "impossibility of
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understandably reluctant to undermine the principle that life has
value and is always preferable to nonexistence.m In answering these
questions, however, courts do not suggest that the assertion that "I
would have been better off if I had not been conceived" is any more
problematic that the assertion that "I would have been better off if
I had been aborted."'" With regard to their hypothetical impact on
the existing child, these events are interchangeable. 1 D5
measuring damages" in wrongful life action); Goldberg ex rd. Goldberg v. Ruskin, 471 N.E.2d
530, 534-35 (Ill. Ct. App. 1984); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209, 213 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1981) ("[T]he comparison between nonexistence and deformed life is necessary but
impossible to make and juries should not be allowed to speculate on the child's damages.");
Wilson v, Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Mo. 1988) (en banc); Procanik, 478 A.2d at 763 ("The
crux of the problem is that there is no rational way to measure non-existence or to compare
non-existence with the pain and suffering of . impaired existence."); Berman v. Allan, 404
A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1979) (measuring "the difference in value between life in an impaired
condition and the 'utter void of nonexistence' .. • is literally impossible"); Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967) ("([Infant plaintiff would have us measure the
difference between his life with defects against the utter void of nonexistence, but it is
impossible to make such a determination."); Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812 (wrongful life action
"demands a calculation of damages dependent upon a comparison between the Hobson's
choice of life in an impaired state and nonexistence"); Williams v. State, 269 N.Y.S.2d 786,
787 (App. Div. 1966); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex. 1984) (wrongful life
"cause of action involves a weighing of life against non-life, a calculation that cannot rationally
be made").
i") ' See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 543 (D.S.C. 1980) (wrongful life
suit inconsistent with "preciousness and sanctity of human life"); Blake, 698 P.2d at 321
(judicial reluctance to recognize wrongful life action "stems partially from the fact that the
theory amounts to a repudiation of the value of human life"); Bruggeman 718 P.2d at 642
(rejecting wrongful life cause of action because "a legal right not to be born—to be dead,
rather than to be alive with deformities—is a theory completely contradictory to our taw");
Proffitt v. Bartolo, 412 N.W.2d 232, 240 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (wrongful life tort often
rejected "as contradictory to the belief that life is precious and that life, even with a major
handicap, is preferable to nonlife"); Berman, 404 A2d at 12-13 (wrongful life action requires
court to disavow the basic assumption on which our society is based, "that life—whether
experienced with or without a major physical handicap—is more precious than non-life");
Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 532 (N.C. 1985) (denying wrongful life claim on
grounds that "life, even life with severe defects, cannot be an injury in the legal sense"). But
see Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 961-62 (Cal. 1982) (rejecting decisions that conclude that
allowing wrongful life suits "would 'disavow' the sanctity and value of less-than-perfect human
life").
I" Some courts, however, do adopt alternative rationales for rejecting a wrongful life
cause of action. See, e.g., Walker ex rd. Pizano v. Mart; 790 P.2d 735, 740 (Ariz. 1990) (en
bane) (because child born with birth defects had no right or ability to control whether she
would be born, physician's negligence in failing to inform parents of condition of fetus
caused legally cognizable injury to parents alone, not to child); James G. v. Caserta, 332
S.E.2d 872, 881 (W. Va. 1985) (the "duty to inform does not extend to the unborn child as
it is the parents' decision to risk conception or to terminate a pregnancy").
105 Indirectly supporting the conclusion in the text, Hare suggests a modification of the
"Golden Rule." Flare posits the moral principle that "we should do to others what we are
July 1992] THE CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY OF ABORTION	 735
Indeed, even the rhetoric of the abortion debate implicitly
recognizes this conclusion. Women usually do have a choice, as anti-
abortion advocates commonly assert. If they do not want to have a
baby, they can practice abstinence or use contraceptives. Once we
recognize the freedom to make that decision, however, the result
of that choice, nonexistence for potential life, is the condition to
which an abortion must be compared when we evaluate its morality.
The question of whether a woman commits a significantly greater
moral wrong by electing to have an abortion rather than preventing
conception requires a comparison of the consequences of these two
events from the perspective of the child-to-be.m As noted, contra-
ception and early abortion result in a similar denial of life oppor-
tunities.
The conservative critic may also argue that our analysis trivial-
izes in moral terms the decision to have an abortion. Any such
contention simply ignores our discussion of the morality of pre-
conception procreative choices. We believe that the decision not to
have children is a serious moral choice.i° 7 By recognizing the moral
comparability of abortion and contraception, we challenge the, con-
tention that the power of men and women to control the creation
and development of new life is devoid of moral implications. We
glad was done to us." Hare, supra note 55, at 208. Applying this principle to abortiOn, Hare
posits:
[W]hen I am glad that I was born .. I do not confine this gladness to gladness
that [my parents] did not abort me. I am glad, also, that my parents copulated
in the first place, without contraception. So from my gladness, in conjunction
with the extended Golden Rule, I derive not only a duty not to abort, but also
a duty not to abstain from procreation.
Id. at 212.
1 °5 Although Hare thinks that the morality of contraception and that of abortion are
much "closer together" than is often believed, he believes they nonetheless remain distinct
in important respects. First, there is a much stronger probability that a fetus will develop
into a normal adult than that a single act of intercourse will eventually produce the same
result. Id. at 219. Second, abortion precludes the mother from subsequent reproductive
activity for a significantly longer period of time than does the use of contraception or
abstinence. Id. Third, parents are more adversely affected psychologically by abortion than
they are by contraception or abstinence. Id.
Not all these distinctions are plausible, and only the first distinction seems significant.
Even in this case, it remains unclear how much moral weight to assign to increasing proba-
bilities of successful development, particularly in the early months of the gestation period.
It also is unclear how Hare's probability analysis applies to drugs or other abortifacients that
are used pre-conception and result in miscarriages. In those situations, the fetus never had
an actual probability of developing into an adult.
107 See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
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do not imply that abortions are morally comparable to cosmetic
surgery simply because they are not morally comparable to murder.
The more flexible conservative will criticize our position on
different grounds. She might argue that one need not choose be-
tween giving potentiality for personhood the same value as person-
hood or no value at all. The conservative maintains that this is a
false dichotomy. The conceptus does have rights and interests that
moral deliberation must take into account, even if they are not the
full equivalent of the rights and interests of a child or adult. More-
over, she believes these rights and interests increase and become
more analogous to those of a child as the gestation period pro-
gresses.m8
We agree. Initially, however, the rights and interests of the
conceptus are the same as those that must be taken into account in
deliberating about whether to have a child. The conservative has
not established the moral significance of conception. Moreover, she
has not provided any criteria for determining the changing moral
status of the conceptus .during the gestation period. Clearly, the
potentiality of the conceptus, in some important sense, becomes
stronger as the pregnancy progresses. What remains indeterminate,
unless one posits some moral threshold, such as having a life worth
living, is how one distinguishes between any particular moment
during the gestation period and any other.
The conservative critic, however, may still remain unsatisfied.
Why should the distinction between having the potential to be a
person with moral standing and actually being such a person be so
critical ,and so rigid? As the conceptus develops during pregnancy,
its moral status surely increases substantially, as does the probability
that it will achieve birth and uncontrovertible personhood. The
question of when a conceptus begins to lead a life worth living and
achieves a status of protected autonomy is indeterminate. If con-
ception is not a crucial event in the developmental continuum,
neither is viability, birth or any other particular moment. Thus, the
essential fluidity of this progression does not justify viewing the
moral status of the conceptus as no greater than that of an unfer-
tilized ovum, until it suddenly jumps to the full moral status of a
IN This argument, of course, is much more often advanced by proponents of abortion
rights. See, e.g., GLOVER, .1 ufrra note 18, at 126 ("[T]he transition from fertilized egg to adult,
like many biological developments, can better be represented by a fairly steady upward curve
than by a series of obviously discrete stages with abrupt transitions?)
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person. It is wrong to kill a potential person that will soon be a
person, even if doing so is not quite as wrong as killing a baby.'° 9
This contention would be much more persuasive if the concep-
tus developed in an environment independent of the mother's body.
In that circumstance, the conceptus's potential could be actualized
in a way that did not directly threaten the physical and psychological
integrity of another person. BuL no such independence exists."°
The conceptus's transformation from a potential person to an actual
person with moral standing is brought about at the pregnant wom-
an's expense, through the use of her body and the sacrifice of her
interests.' The conceptus cannot insist on the right to fulfill its
natural potential without interference because from the very begin-
ning the conceptus can be characterized as an interfering agent
whose actions and transformation fundamentally alter the woman's
condition. "2
109 For the absolute conservative, this indeterminacy could justify protecting the concep-
tus from the moment of conception throughout the gestation period. Thus, Callahan argues:
As embryology and fetology advance, it becomes clear that human development
is a continuum. Within such a continuous growth process, it is hard to defend
logically any demarcation point after conception as the point at which an im-
mature form of human life is so different from the day before or the day after,
that it can be morally or legally discounted as a person.
Sidney Callahan, A Pri?-life Feminist Makes Her Case, UTNE READER, Mar.–Apr., 1987, at 104,
105.
Conversely, the critical question for the flexible conservative 'is identifying criteria that
justify attributing a substantial claim to life to the conceptus at the earliest possible time in
the gestation period. Langerak, for example, argues that two factors, the increased probability
that the conceptus will survive to become a baby and the extent to which allowing abortion
undermines the protection provided to other vulnerable persons such as infants, control the
increasing claim to life of the fetus through the gestation period. Langerak, supra note 18,
at 259-61.
110 As Sylvia Law states:
Fetal life is starkly different from all other forms of human life in that the fetus
is completely dependent upon the body of the woman who conceived it. It
cannot survive without her. Although all human infants, and many adults, are
dependent upon others for survival, that support can be provided by many
people. The fetus by contrast is dependent upon a particular woman.
Law, supra note 91, at 1023.
11 Law goes on to note:
People who are dependent—infants, the poor, the elderly, and the disabled—
make a strong moral claim on the resources of a society of abundance .... But
the sustenance the fetus needs is not society's to give. It car only be provided
by a particular pregnant woman. Forcing her to support the dependent fetus
denies her capacity to decide whether that is a relationship that she can sustain
and imposes enormous costs on her life, health and autonomy.
Id. at 1027.
112 Even before implantation occurs, the presence of the fertilized egg in the uterus
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The point here is not that either the conceptus or the mother
must be identified as the active aggressor during pregnancy. The
distinction between actively harming another or failing to assist
another in distress is not always useful, particularly in special con-
texts such as this. It is - true that the mother who. gets an abortion
acts affirmatively to terminate her pregnancy, but the moral status
of her conduct would not change if she deliberately withdrew es-
sential support that the conceptus needed to survive. In situations
of absolute dependency, there is little difference between acting and
failing to act. Certainly a mother who deliberately fails to feed her
baby until it dies is fully responsible for its death." 3
 Not acting does
not make her less blameworthy.
-•• Similarly, the condition of acting does not necessarily increase
an individual's culpability. For example, assume an individual un-
knowingly swims near someone drowning in the ocean. In a last act
before losing consciousness the drowning person throws out his
hand, catches the other swimmer by the hair and reflexively entan-
gles his hand in her hair. In this situation; detaching the victim's
hand is surely no more wrongful than the act of deliberately failing
to rescue him before contact takes place. Our moral evaluation of
the swimmer's conduct will be based primarily on other factors,
such as the swimmer's ability to effectuate a rescue without sacrific-
ing her own life. That a deliberate action instead of an inaction
occurs would not be an important aspect of our moral calculus." 4
results in significant physical changes in the mother's body. RODMAN ET AL, supra note 87, at
32. The conceptus requires a transformation of the mother from her pre-pregnant state in
order to create an environment in which it can develop. The conceptus has no generative
power in isolation. Thus, even the initial steps toward fulfilling its potential requires imme-
diate dedication of another person's existence toward that objective.
Put simply:
the fetus is an egoist, not merely a helpless dependent. Its purpose is to see
that its own needs are served, and this is achieved by causing a substantial
upheaval to its mother's physiology. The changes in maternal physiology serve
to ensure maternal well-being, and to ensure that the fetal "supply line" works
effectively.
ALAN L.R. FINDLAY, REPRODUCTION AND THE FETUS 83 (1984).
"3 See, e,g., De Leon v. State, 684 S.W.2d 777,778 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) ("The omission
by a parent to perform his statutory parental duty [to provide food and medical care] which
results in the death of the child, if done intentionally and knowingly, is murder.").'
"4 Tooley postulates a "moral symmetry principle" that holds that there is no moral
distinction between acting and not acting. MICHAEL TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE
186-87 (1983). The authors do not endorse this conclusion for the purposes of our argument.
It is sufficient to accept Tooley's related point, that in comparing the morality of failing to
save an individual from death with the morality of killing a person, the moral analysis often
is controlled by other factors, such as the actor's motivation and the cost and risk involved,
more than it is by the isolated distinction between acting and not acting. Id. at 187-89.
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in cases involving pregnancy and other dependencies, the crit-
ical issue is not whether either party should be characterized as
playing an active or passive role. Rather, there is a conflict between
the conceptus's interest in fulfilling its potential through the use of
the pregnant woman's body, and the woman's interest in not being
forced to sacrifice her bodily integrity to help the conceptus achieve
moral standing." 5 Again, the question is comparable to that of the
" 5 Subsequent to implantation, the development of the embryo remains particularly
vulnerable to environmental disturbances during the next 45 days. KEITH L. MOORE, THE
DEVELOPING HUMAN: CLINICALLY ORIENTED EMBRYOLOGY 151 (1982). Accordingly, warnings
to pregnant women to avoid teratogenic agents— i.e., those tending to cause developmental
malformations—are crucial in the first two months of the gestation period. Id. at 153.
Indeed, the positive development of the fetus may require substantial changes in the
woman's physical and psycho-social environment through much of the pregnancy. A growing
literature, for example, confirms that significant stress, anxiety and family discord in the
mother's life during pregnancy ultimately results in higher incidents of adverse physical and
psychological consequences for the child. See, e.g., Peter R. Dallman, Iron Deficiency: Does It
Matter?, 226 J. INTERNAL MED. 367 (1989) (iron deficiency in diet of pregnant women
associated with low birth weight, prematurity and perinatal mortality); CAI L. Keen & Lucille
S. Hurley, Effects of Zinc Deficiency on Prenatal and Postnatal Development, 8 NEUROTOXICOLOGY
379 (1987) (zinc deficiency in mothers results in abnormal births); Herbert L. Needleman,
Low Level Lead Exposure in The Fetus and Young Child; 8 NEuRoToxrcoLocv 389 (1987) (adverse
developmental consequence from lead ingested by mothers and passed through to fetus);
Alan J. Ward, A Comparison and Analysis of the Presence of Family Problems During Pregnancy of
Mothers of "Autistic" Children and Mothers of Normal Children, 20 CHILD PSYCHIATRY & HUM.
Day. 279, 286 (1990) (family discord during pregnancy affects psychological development of
child); Harold Williamson, Jr., et at., Association Between Life Stress and Serious Perinatal Com-
plications, 29 J. FAM. PRAC. 489 (1989) (prenatal stress affects physical development of child);
Arthur Wynn & Margaret Wynn, Nutrition Around Conception and the Prevention of Low Bir-
thweight, 6 NUTRITION & HEALTH 37 (1988) (connection between low birth weight, condition
commonly associated with perinatal death, and maternal consumption of nutrients) See
generally ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. SCI., VOL. 562, PRENATAL ABUSE OF LICIT AND ILLICIT
DRUGS (Donald E. Hutchings ed., 1989) (discussing effect of prenatal alcohol and drug use
on fetal and child development).
The evidence is less certain with regard to the effect of a woman's employment activity
on pre- and postnatal health. Compare Richard L. Naaye & Ellen C. Peters, Working During
Pregnancy: Effects on the Fetus, 69 PEDIATRICS 724, 724-27 (1982) (maternal work, particularly
in standing occupations, during third trimester impairs fetal growth); Helen Taskinen, Effects
of Parental Occupational Exposures on Spontaneous Abortion and Congenital Malformation, 16
SCANDINAVIAN J. WORK ENV'T & HEALTH 297 (1990) with Mark A. Klebanoff et al., The Effect
of Physical Activity During Pregnancy on Preterin Delivery and Birth Weight, 163 AM. J. OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY 1450 (1990) (heavy work or exercise not associated with preterm delivery or
reduced fetal growth); Gunnar Ahlborg Jr. et al., Heavy Lifting During Pregnancy—A Hazard
to The Fetus? A Prospective Study, 19 INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 90 (1990).
Overall, it seems clear that it is a gross mischaracterization to describe the conceptus as
a passive being whose developmental needs are naturally satisfied. Rather, the conceptus
must be developed by the pregnant woman through myriad conscious and unconscious
actions. In this context, the creative role of the mother cannot reasonably be viewed as
completed at conception or implantation so that from that time on the conceptus has an
independent existence and right to continue its development. External assistance and the
mother's active participation is as necessary post-conception as pre-conception.
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woman fulfilling the potential within her body prior to conception
to create a new life. As the essential source of that potential in the
first place, the mother may act wrongfully in obtaining an abortion,
but only in the sense that she does not complete an act of creation
that is within her power.
A final challenge to our thesis contends that it proves far too
much to be tenable. If abortion is no greater 'a wrong than the
deliberate decision not to conceive, because limiting the conceptus
to some minimal life is roughly comparable to providing it no life
at all, why cannot that same argument be used to justify infanticide?
A mother who kills her two-week-old child can claim that she at
least gave him two weeks of life that he would. not have lived to
enjoy had she elected her other legitimate choice and not conceived
him. The argument that consciousness is the minimum predicate
both for having a life worth living and any plausible claim to au-
tonomy in one's choices is an inadequate foundation on which to
base one's moral opposition to either late abortion or infanticide.
This criticism involves two related contentions. First, making
consciousness a necessary condition for having a life worth living is
unacceptably indeterminate. It makes moral standing depend on
the question of when consciousness occurs, and even more problem-
atically, on the question of exactly what constitutes consciousness.
As development progresses and mental ability increases, we face a
new indeterminate and potentially arbitrary issue to resolve. The
question now would be when the mental state of the conceptus
supports the conclusion that it has a life worth living. Arguably,
attempting to resolve this issue would not create any less of a polit-
ical and legal quagmire than currently exists." 6
Second, and even more problematically, some may attempt to
define the level of consciousness necessary for having a life worth
living at so high a level of mental ability as to exclude the eight-
month-old conceptus, and, perhaps, the newborn baby as well.
Clearly, it will be possible to achieve some scientific and moral
consensus with regard to the beginning of the gestation period. The
conceptus lacks meaningful consciousness during the first trimester;
116
 There is hardly a clear consensus on what degree of consciousness or mental ability
constitutes a life worth living, to which moral standing would accrue. M Tribe put it suc-
cinctly, "the question when human life truly begins asks not for a discovery of the point at
which the fetus possesses an agreed upon set of characteristics which make it human, but
rather for a decision as to what characteristics should be regarded as defining a human
being." Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term, Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in
The Due Process of Life and Law. 87 HARV. L Ray. 1, 21 (1973).
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few would argue that life as a ten-week conceptus constitutes a life
worth living.'" Thus, the legality of the overwhelming majority of
abortions performed in the United States could be constitutionally
confirmed." 8
The status of the conceptus near the end of the gestation
period, however, cannot be described with complete confidence.
The level of consciousness that the authors argue is necessary for a
life worth living is imprecise and subject to debate. 19 If the requisite
117 Professor Clifford Grobstein argues:
It seems clear that there is an early period of fetal development when you don't
have to worry about a sentient being, because there is no anatomical or physi-
ological basis for it. From 8 to 20 weeks, the central nervous system is so
extremely immature—especially the brain—that there seems no possibility of
any awareness.
Elizabeth Hall, When Does Life Begin?—A Conversation with Clifford Grobstein, Psvcitot, TODAY,
Sept. 1989, at 44. Grobstein elaborates at length on his understanding of this aspect of
prenatal development in CLIFFORD GROBSTEIN, SCIENCE AND THE UNBORN CHOOSING HUMAN
FUTURES (1988). Biologist Michael J. Flower similarly concludes that "it is probably not until
after 28 weeks of gestation that the fetal human attains a level of neocortex-mediated
complexity sufficient to enable those sentient capacities the presence of which might lead us
to predicate personhood of a sort we attribute to full-term newborns." Doerr, supra note 44,
at 51, 53.
Even some conservative theorists concede this point if the abortion debate is confined to
non-religious argument. Ernest Van den Haag explains:
It is the embryo that might be aborted, not what it will, but has not yet, become.
If it, as yet, lacks the distinctly human characteristics that might entitle it to
social protection on purely secular grounds, one must ask: When does intra-
uterine life become human life? What characteristics are distinctively human?
One may disagree on the sufficient characteristics. However, there is little dis-
agreement on the necessary ones. Surely these are absent in the first 12 weeks
after conception. The embryo has neither a brain nor the neural system which
makes sentience possible.
Before sentience the embryo cannot be aware of itself, or of losing a future
by not being allowed to develop . . . Only upon acquiring a functioning brain
and neural system, after the first trimester, does it become possible, though not
yet probable, for the fetus even to feel pain.
Ernest van den Haag, Is There a Middle Ground?, NAT'L REV., Dec. 22, 1989, at 29, 30. Despite
this general consensus, there is considerable dispute as to when actual sentience begins. Some
antiabortion groups argue that brain activity exists prior to six weeks and that the fetus
experiences and reacts to pain as early as 12 weeks. The statements of Dr. Grobstein, among
others, dispute these contentions. See Human Life Bill, supra note 46.
Ill/ Approximately ten percent of the abortions performed in the United States occur in
the second and third trimester. RODMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 57.
"° Brain development increases rapidly from the third to sixth month of the gestation
period. By the end of the second trimester the fetus demonstrates reflex movements that
are "evidence of central nervous system activity." Id. at 34. According to Grobstein:
From 20 to 30 weeks is an uncertain period and we don't know where to come
down [with regard to fetal sentience). Once past the 20-week mark, the brain
is maturing and there are some connections between neurons in the cortex. We
can be doubtful but we can't be sure there's no inner experience . . . When
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state of consciousness is defined in terms of higher mental ability,
such as the capacity to possess "the concept of a continuing self," 1 "
very late abortions, or even infanticide, are potentially justifiable on
the grounds that the conceptus has not yet achieved moral stand-
in g. 121
This is strong and fair criticism. Although one response to it
might rely on scientific evidence regarding the mental abilities of a
third trimester conceptus,• that evidence is so ambiguous as to pre-
clude a peremptory dismissal of the conservative's concerns. If our
model is to defend the widely shared intuition that third trimester
abortions are morally suspect unless supported by substantial jus-
tification, an additional response is required.' 22 This is precisely
what we provide in the next section. We must evaluate the morality
of abortion not only in terms of the status of the conceptus, but
also with regard to the changing nature of the woman's interest in
having an abortion.
this middle period ends, at about 30 weeks, we do have to worry about possible
minimal awareness . . . . If we arbitrarily set the boundary of sentience, psychic
individuality, at 26 weeks (the beginning of the last trimester), we provide a
safety margin.
Hall, supra note 117, at 44-46. What is less clear, of course, is whether the degree of mental
and physical development that occurs between 20 and 30 weeks is sufficient to support what
we would recognize as a life worth living. From the perspective of the authors, a conclusion
establishing the end of the second trimester as the point in time in fetal development at
which discretionary abortions might be generally restricted would be acceptable, although
not required. This is in accord with Grobstein's analysis; he describes a "predecessor to .. .
self-awareness," "a rudimentary form of self," and a "diffuse sentience" that is extremely
unlikely to occur prior to twenty-six weeks of gestation. GROBSTEIN, supra note 117, at 123-
24, 130. For a lengthy and sophisticated analysis of psychological and neurophysiological
data suggesting that newborn infants lack sufficient mental development to achieve person-
hood for moral purposes, see TOOLEY, supra note 114, at 359-412. We believe this question
need not be answered dispositively in most cases, however, because of the changed status of
the pregnant woman at the latter part of the gestation period. See infra notes 137-77 and
accompanying text.
22° Tooley, supra note 16, at 94-95. Tooley posits that lain individual cannot have a
right to continued existence unless there is at least one time at which it possesses the concept
of a continuing self or mental substance."
' 2 ' Id, at 95-96 (arguing that since behavioral and neurophysiological studies indicate
that human fetuses do not possess any concept of a continuing self they do not possess a
right to life).
' 22
 It is not sufficient to argue, without more, that the substantial probability that a fetus
in the third trimester will soon lead a life worth living justifies restrictions on late term
abortion. That analysis suggests a completely arbitrary determination of when the potential
life of the soon-to-be-born baby attains sufficient moral value that it outweighs the mother's
rights, without even considering what the mother's interests are or how they should be
valued.
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR PROTECTING A WOMAN'S
DECISION TO H'AVE AN ABORTION
Thus far, we have been discussing the morality of abortion
from the position of the conservative. Accordingly, our attention
has been directed exclusively toward the moral status of the con-
ceptus. From the conservative's perspective, the woman's interest
does not even seem to exist, or at least it is not worthy of serious
consideration in light of the magnitude of the interests on the other
side of the moral equation.
Many writers have challenged and condemned the failure of
the conservative to rigorously examine the interests of women. They
base their criticism on the grounds that the morality of an act must
always be evaluated in context.'" This is true even of an act of
extreme moral significance, such as the killing of a person. From
this perspective, even the wrongfulness of infanticide, which com-
mon sense morality indisputably recognizes, is not predicated on
the evolving status of the newborn alone. Rather, the issue is an
ethically simple one because of the total lack of justification for
committing such an act once the baby is physically separate from
the mother. Thus, several critics challenge the conservative position
on its own turf, so to speak, by conceding personhood to the con-
ceptus. Judith Thomson,'" Donald Regan'" and others argue that
accepting this premise of personhood does not entail the conclusion
that all abortions are immoral. When one examines the interests of
the woman, abortion may be justified even if it results in the death
of a person.
These kinds of criticisms of the conservative position generally
are based on the same considerations that in the common law excuse
or justify conduct that would otherwise subject the actor to tort or
criminal liability. Thus, one may describe the woman's interest in
having an abortion as an act of self-defense or as a failure to sacrifice
one's own interests to assist another. 126 Such arguments have much
to commend them. The privilege or excuse of self-defense has been
interpreted to encompass acts that are done in the mistaken but
See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 34, at 129-35; Law, supra note 91, at 1021-22.
"4 Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 11 J. Pan.. & Pus. AFF. 47,48-49 (1971).
' 25 Donald Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979).
126 See Patricia A. Cain & Jean C. Love, Stories of Rights: Developing Moral Theory and
Teaching Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1365,1379 (1988).
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reasonable belief that the actor was seriously threatened.'" It also
has been successfully asserted to protect the dignity of the individual
who forswears a safe opportunity to escape his aggressor and in-
stead resorts to deadly force to avoid the ignominy of being forced
to retreat. 128
 From this foundation, obvious analogies to abortion
are possible. The failure to act and good Samaritan analysis is also
a provocative line of inquiry to consider.' 29
The difficulty with both these approaches, however, is their
uncertain relevance to the constitutionality of abortion. The scope
of the privilege of self-defense accepted by a state, and the extent
to which the state imposes on its citizens a duty to render assistance,
are matters of public pblicy for legislative determination or common
law adjudication. They typically do not raise constitutional con-
cerns.'" The preceding arguments may be used to undermine the
127 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 19, at 125
(5th ed. 1984).
128 The Restatement of Torts notes:
In many parts of the country, the ideal of social manhood has included as one
of its prime requisites courage and dignity. The interest of the actor in his
personal dignity has been regarded as of greater importance than the social
interest in the prevention of deadly affrays, and in the preservation of life and
limb of those engaged in them. In many jurisdictions, therefore it is held that
one threatened with a deadly attack may stand his ground and protect himself
against it by deadly force even though he knows that he can with perfect safety
avoid the necessity of doing so by retreat.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 65 (1966); see also People v. Bush, 111  N.E.2d 326,328
(III. 1953); KEETON ET. AL., supra note 127, at 127.
128 Both Thomson, supra note 124, at 62-64, and Regan, supra note 125, at 1571-1610,
discuss abortion from the perspective of women being required to act as good Samaritans
for the benefit of the fetus while similar duties are seldom imposed on other potential good
Samaritans.
13° In his well-known article, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, supra note 125, Regan energetically
and unsuccessfully tries to develop constitutional doctrine from his common law analysis of
self defense and good Samaritan cases. Id. at 1618-39. He initially posits constitutional
principles of "non-subordination" and "freedom from physical invasion" that would serve to
protect the right to an abortion. Id. at 1619. Regan concedes, however, that both principles
provide flawed foundations for his constitutional argument. Id. at 1619-21. Accordingly, he
ultimately contends that an equal protection analysis is necessary. Id. at 1621. Anti-abortion
laws violate equal protection principles because "twlomen who want abortions are required
to give aid in circumstances where closely analogous potential samaritans are not. And they
are required to give aid of a kind and an extent that is required of no other potential samaritan."
Id. at 1622.
Regan's equal protection argument, however, is totally divorced from conventional equal
protection analysis. Under Regan's model, fundamental rights and suspect classifications are
not essential predicates for rigorous review. Nor is strict or intermediate level scrutiny the
appropriate standard of review. As an alternative, Regan suggests a "reasonable American
legislature test." Id. at 1627. Under this approach, inequalities that are "especially costly and
specially resented" require "special justification" to be upheld. Anti-abortion laws require
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state's claim that its moral concern in protecting potential life con-
stitutes a compelling state interest. They cast doubt on the validity
and value of the state's purposes. They do not confront directly,
however, the constitutional side of the balance on which the wom-
an's privacy and autonomy rights are weighed.
A. The Failure of Roe v. Wade
A fair and persuasive analysis of the right to have an abortion
must carefully examine the interests of the woman from a consti-
tutional perspective. The place to start such an analysis is the Su-
preme Court's majority opinion in Roe v. Wade. Justice Blackmun's
opinion in Roe examined two state interests, protecting the life and
health of the mother and protecting potential life, and balanced
them against the woman's right to privacy and autonomy."' In
such careful balancing because they violate anti-subordination and freedom from physical
invasion principles and disproportionally burden women, a group that has been historically
subject to discrimination. Id. at 1630-31.
The difficulty with Regan's argument: is that the anti-subordination and freedom from
physical invasion principles he expresses have traditionally been left to the legislature and
common law courts to enforce. Failure to act and self defense rules and decisions have never
been subjected to constitutional scrutiny. Moreover, generalized burdens such as conscription,
which require both subordination and exposure to physical invasion, do not raise serious
constitutional concerns under current doctrine. Regan may be correct, of course, that many
anti-abortion laws are unfair, but he has to transform radically the Court's equal protection
doctrine to make that unfairness a matter of constitutional significance.
151 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 148-52 (1973). The argument over whether the decision
to terminate a pregnancy is subsumed within the right of privacy and procreational autonomy
that the Supreme Court first recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
and its progeny is expressed succinctly in the debate between Justices White (dissenting) and
Stevens (concurring) in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 776, 792 (1986). Justice White argued:
As the Court appropriately recognized in Roe v. Wade,"[t]he pregnant woman
cannot be isolated in her privacy" the termination of a pregnancy typically
involves the destruction of another entity: the fetus. However one answers the
metaphysical or theological question whether the fetus is a "human being" or
the legal question whether it is a "person" as that term is used in the Consti-
tution, ... the continued existence and development—that is to say, the life--
of such an entity are so directly at stake in the woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy, that decision must be recognized as sui genesis,
different in kind from the others that the Court has protected under the rubric
of personal or family privacy and autonomy.
Id. at 792 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice White then added in a footnote:
That the abortion decision, like the decisions protected in Griswold, Eisenstadt,
and Carey, concerns childbearing (or, more generally, family life) in no sense
necessitates a holding that the liberty to choose abortion is "fundamental." That
the decision involves the destruction of the fetus renders it different in kind
from the decision not to conceive in the first place. This difference does not go
merely to the weight of the state interest in regulating abortion; it affects as
746	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:689
implementing that balancing process, Justice Blackmun described
well the characterization of the liberty interest itself. For if the liberty to make
certain decisions with respect to contraception without governmental constraint
is "fundamental," it is not only because those decisions are "serious" and "im-
portant" to the individual, see ante, at 776 (Stevens, J., concurring), but also
because some value of privacy or individual autonomy that is somehow implicit
in the scheme of ordered liberties established by the Constitution supports a
judgment that such decisions are none of government's business. The same
cannot be said where, as here, the individual is not "isolated in her privacy."
Id. at 792 n.2.
Justice Stevens's response ignored Justice White's argument that rights of privacy and
autonomy are grounded on two essential conditions, the importance of the interest to the
individual and the judgment that such decisions are none of the government's business.
Justice Stevens considered only the seriousness of the woman's decision, and on that basis
found White's conclusion incomprehensible. Justice Stevens wrote:
There may, of course, be a significant difference in the strength of the coun-
tervailing state interest, but I fail to see how a decision on childbearing becomes
less important the day after conception than the day before. Indeed, if one
decision is more "fundamental" to the individual's freedom than the other,
surely it is the post-conception decision that is the more serious .. .
Id. at 776 (Stevens, J., concurring).
It is not clear, however, that Justice Stevens actually disputed Justice White's assertion
that there is a "none of the government's business" dimension to defining the scope of privacy
and autonomy rights. As is clear from his analysis distinguishing the state's interest in
protecting an embryo from its interest in protecting an infant, Justice Stevens did not believe
that the event of conception dramatically changes the state's "business" in regulating pro-
creational decisions. See id. at 778-79 (Stevens, J., concurring). Thus, he challenged the
premise on which Justice White based his judgment, that abortion inherently involves im-
portant state concerns that distinguish it from other exercises of the right to privacy and
autonomy. From that perspective, Justice Stevens did not need to address the broader issue
of how the Court should define privacy and autonomy rights.
That question is not easily resolved. The parameters of even enumerated rights are
difficult to discern and often cannot be clearly identified. For example, in determining
whether expressive activity is protected by the First Amendment, courts typically examine
both the activity itself (e.g., is it speech or conduct and does it communicate a message?) as
well as the consequences of the activity on state interests. Consider speech that is subject to
sanction (under Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)) because it threatens to incite
immediate violence. Under one approach, expression that creates a clear and present danger
is unprotected speech. Alternatively, such expression is protected by the First Amendment,
but the state has a sufficiently compelling interest in suppressing such speech that it may do
so and withstand rigorous constitutional scrutiny. Even if the former description is the
accurate one, is the basis for determining that speech is unprotected fundamentally different
from the analysis the court uses to evaluate an allegedly compelling state interest that
outweighs the exercise of protected rights?
Moreover, it is not clear that the Supreme Court must resolve this problem the same
way for all constitutional rights. Unlike freedom of speech, which seems to protect a generic
activity with intrinsic parameters, the right of privacy and personal autonomy may be more
analogous to freedom of religion. Religious practice, like personal autonomy choices, might
include an almost limitless range of behavior. See Alan Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly
and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the
Constitution, 51 Oxio ST. L.J. 89 (1990). There is little in the basic idea of religion or autonomy
that suggests the boundaries of the right. Thus, the Court may need to consider some external
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how he believed the state's interests change while the woman's
interest remains constant during the gestation period.'" His analysis
indicia. With regard to privacy and autonomy rights, some decisions may not be sufficiently
personal or private to warrant protection despite their importance to the individual asserting
the right. Proponents of the right to have an abortion cannot summarily dismiss Justice
White's "none of the government's business" limit on the nature of privacy rights.
What Justice White fails to address adequately, however, is the issue of how courts are
to determine that a liberty interest, otherwise fundamental to a pregnant woman, is not a
right because the termination of pregnancies allegedly implicates the state's business. In one
sense, everything, including the use of pre-conception contraceptives, is of interest to the
state. Thus, there must he some way to evaluate when a procreational interest is sufficiently
part of the public's business to prevent it from being protected as a right. Justice White
simply declares that the fact of conception satisfies his unstated criteria for answering this
question.
This issue arose again in glaring terms during the oral argument of Planned Parenthood
of S.E. Pa. v. Casey before the United States Supreme Court. Justice Stevens asked Kenneth
Starr, the Solicitor General of the United States, to defend his contention that a state has a
compelling interest in protecting potential life throughout a women's pregnancy. In partic-
ular, Justice Stevens inquired of Starr, "You argue very vigorously there's no textual basis
supporting your opponent's position. What is the textual basis for your position that there's
a compelling interest in something that is not a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment?"
Starr ultimately replied, "The state has an interest in its potential citizen, it does not
have to be granted, have the basis in the Constitution. Justice Stevens, it is my view that the
state can look out and say we, as we have historically, regulate and legislate in the interests
of those who will come into being, who will be born. It is an interest that every member of
this Court has said in potential life."
After Justice Stevens continued to press him to describe the textual source for his
conclusion, Starr added, "I think it's in the nature of our system. And if nothing else, the
Tenth Amendment, Justice Stevens, suggests that the state can order its relationships in ways
that reflect the morality of the people, within limits." Abortion and the Lazo: A Day in Court
After Years of Skirmishing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1992, at A13.
Starr's problem, of course, is not so much the lack of a textual source in the Constitution
for his argument that protecting potential life from the moment of conception constitutes a
compelling state interest. The weakness of his argument is that it justifies protecting potential
life before conception as well as after that event. Nothing in Starr's answer explains why the
state's interest in "those who will come into being" or in "ordering its relationships in ways
that reflect the morality of people" only becomes compelling after conception occurs.
This article assumes that the degree to which the existence of the fetus changes the
state's interest in procreation decisions remains to be determined. Given the premise that
pre-conception procreational choices are fundamentally private and constitutionally pro-
tected, however, substantial justification is necessary to negate totally the existence of that
right at the moment of conception. Although we recognize initially the continuation of a
right to privacy and procreational choice after conception, and use the terminology of the
strict scrutiny standard to determine if the state's interest in protecting potential life is a
sufficient basis for abridging the right, the alternative conceptualization of the issue should
not alter the fundamental problem requiring resolution. If it is argued that the right of
procreational choice ends absolutely at conception, that conclusion must still be defended.
We suggest that any such explanation should parallel an analysis that recognizes the existence
of the right during pregnancy but also acknowledges compelling state interests that justify
abridging the right.
132 Id. at 162-64.
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resulted in the well-known trimester framework, pursuant to which
the Court will most rigorously evaluate state regulation of first
trimester abortions and least rigorously evaluate state regulation of
third trimester abortions.'"
The holding of Justice Blackmun's opinion is both aggressively
supported and condemned because of its results. Whichever reac-
tion one has to Roe, it seems fair to conclude that the Court's
reasoning is unpersuasive. In particular, Justice Blackmun spent
little time justifying the conclusion that the viability of the fetus is
the critical event during the gestation period for determining when
the balance of interests shift in favor of the state's interest in pro-
tecting potential life.'"
The weakness of the Roe opinion, however, is not simply that
the importance it attributes to one aspect of fetal development,
viability, is unsubstantiated.'" The entire thrust of the opinion is
misdirected. As we suggested earlier, an examination of the moral
standing of the conceptus alone will necessarily result in conclusions
that are subject to challenge. It is difficult to attach very much
significance to any one point in time in a developmental continuum.
All attempts to do so are vulnerable to the question of why this
moment is ethically distinct from one hour earlier or one hour later
in the conceptus's evolution.'"
1 " Id.
"'Justice Blackmun wrote simply:
[W]ith respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life,
the 'compelling' point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably
has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation
protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifi-
cations.
Id. at 163.
I35 Presumably, one reason for designating viability as the point during the pregnancy
at which abortion may be prohibited is that only then can the fetus be separated from the
mother without necessitating its destruction. Thus, viability is defended as a valid legal
distinction because "[alt that point where the fetus need no longer depend on the mother
for survival, a woman is no longer making a baby but bearing it; that is, she is able to turn
it over to another person, presumably without harm." Donald Burrill, Abortion Moderates on
Shaky Ground, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Apr. 25, 1990, at 420.
Because the fetus remains within the mother, however, it is not clear how or why viability
changes the ethical equation. There is no way to separate the viable fetus from the woman
that is not as massively intrusive of her bodily integrity as is the alternative of carrying the
fetus to term. Indeed, if separation were to be accomplished at viability, the method most
protective of the fetus would be delivery by hysterotomy (premature caesarian section), a
method that "involves maximal maternal invasion." J.K. MASON, MEDICO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF
REPRODUCTION AND PARENTHOOD 158 (1990).
'" See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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The more fundamental flaw in Roe is Justice Blackmun's lack
of analytic attention to the woman's interests and rights. Roe defends
these rights much more effectively than it discusses them. In truth,
although they approach the problem from radically different per-
spectives, both the majority opinion in Roe and much of the con-
servative criticism of Roe fail to examine seriously the rights of
women.'"
We propose an alternative analysis that challenges a central
orthodoxy of Roe v. Wade. In contrast to Justice Blackmun's ap-
proach in Roe, which focuses on the varying nature of the state's
interest in regulating abortion and views the woman's rights as
uniform throughout the gestation period, we suggest a more com-
plete analysis. Although we agree that development matters and
that the state's interest changes during pregnancy, exclusive atten-
tion to this indeterminate variable may result in fruitless inquiry
and unpersuasive conclusions. We suggest that the woman's right
also varies during pregnancy and that this change in interest shifts
the balance of state interests against fundamental rights in many
cases. Indeed, if the woman's interest in terminating her pregnancy
declines to a sufficient extent, the balancing necessary to justify
abortion restrictions may be accomplished without determining ex-
actly when the conceptus experiences a life worth living. In consti-
tutional terms, the state's interest in protecting even potential life
may outweigh the woman's interest in terminating a pregnancy late
in the gestation period.
B. The Varying Nature of the Woman's Interest
Just as the nature of killing can be broken down into compo-
nent concerns for the purposes of analyzing the morality of abor-
tion, a woman's right to have an abortion can be divided into several
divergent interests. These include the right to sexual autonomy, the
right to bodily integrity and autonomy, and the right to psycholog-
ical independence and integrity." 8 Each of these interests has im-
I" In Roe, "Nile story of women was almost nonexistent; the story of the law of abortion,
of medical knowledge, and of doctors took its place. The focus was less on women, and more
on fetuses, fetal life, and the responsibility of physicians and their 'right' to administer
treatment." Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 Macn. L. REV. 1574, 1626 (1987).
136 Obviously, an additional interest of the pregnant woman is that of avoiding the long
term economic, social and psychological burdens of motherhood—of raising a child to adult-
hood. We do not consider that interest in this article because it is capable of resolution
through a mechanism other than abortion, that is, by having the baby adopted or cared for
by the state. We do not suggest that such alternatives are always feasible or meritorious. That
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portant ramifications for the right of privacy and autonomy pro-
tected in the abortion cases. More importantly, each of these
interests varies significantly during the gestation period.
1. The Right to Sexual Autonomy and the Right to Bodily
Integrity
Although the Supreme Court is inclined to use narrower and
less controversial terminology, such as the rights of marriage and
procreation,'" it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the right
to have an abortion is grounded, at least in part, on a right to sexual
autonomy. The Court has never directly acknowledged that such a
right exists.m° However, there is no other way to intelligibly inter-
pret the case law. The extension of the Court's holding in Griswold
v. Connecticut"' to a line of authority invalidating virtually any law
restricting the distribution of contraceptives clearly undercuts any
literal privacy rationale underlying Griswold. 142
 Judicial aversion to
police searches of the marital bedroom to discover tell-tale signs of
contraceptive usage° cannot reasonably support, for example, the
conclusion in Carey v. Population Services Internationalm that a law
prohibiting the sale of contraceptives by anyone other than a li-
censed pharmacist is unconstitutional. 145
issue is clearly in dispute. See, e.g., ROBERT D. GOLDSTEIN, MOTHER-LOVE AND ABORTION: A
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 63-64, 179-91 (1988). Because the mother's obligation to raise her
child may be mitigated or avoided through sufficiently supportive state intervention, however,
this interest raises a different and less intractable form of moral dilemma than the other
interests identified in the text.
159
 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (quoting Roe v.
Wade in support of the conclusion that the right of personal privacy covers personal decisions
"'relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and
education. ") (citations omitted)).
1" In Carey, Justice Brennan concluded that "the Court has not definitively answered the
difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regu-
lating [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults." Id. at 688 n,5. Subsequently, the
Court concluded that "any claim that [cases such as Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe and Carey]
nevertheless stand for the proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct between
consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is unsupportable."
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1985) (citations omitted).
" I
 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
142
 See Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979
SUP. CT. REV. 173, 190-200 (arguing that contraception cases subsequent to Cris/void dem-
onstrate that the Court is protecting "sexual liberty," not privacy).
"'Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
144
 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
"3 Id. at 689-90 (challenged law unconstitutionally "renders contraceptive devices con-
siderably less accessible to the public" by restricting sales outlets, "reduces the opportunity
for privacy of selection and purchase, and lessens the possibility of price competition").
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Moreover, the contraception cases must be based on a broader
principle than the right to procreate. Contraceptive devices, of
course, do not directly facilitate having children. Nor can protecting
access to and the use of contraceptives be rationalized, as part of a
generalized right to procreate, on the grounds that such devices
assist people in implementing their decision not to have children.
That argument proves too much. Bluntly speaking, doing anything
as a substitute for engaging in heterosexual intercourse helps people
to avoid having children. The contraception cases must be under-
stood as protecting the right to engage in sexual activity without
risking the natural consequences that might otherwise result from
such activity.
Given the existence of a right to sexual autonomy, it is not
difficult to defend the right to have an abortion as directly derivative
of that right. The possibility of becoming pregnant and having a
baby is frequently experienced as a burden on a woman's decision
to engage in sexual activity.'46 Although the use of contraceptives
mitigates that burden by reducing the risk of impregnation, contra-
ceptives are not foolproof. Without the availability of abortion,
sexual intercourse always involves a risk. This burden on sexual
autonomy is significant, even if the risk of pregnancy is low, because
the impact of an unwanted pregnancy is so great. The right to have
an abortion instrumentally furthers the right of sexual autonomy
by permitting women to reduce that impact substantially.' 41
Not only is the right to have an abortion derived in part from
the right of sexual autonomy, it is in one important respect depen-
148 See, e.g., Law, supra note 91, at 1019 ("State action restricting access to abortion imposes
a crushing restraint on the heterosexual women's [sic] capacity for sexual expression.").
147 The close relationship between the right of sexual autonomy and the right to have
an abortion is reflected to some extent by the social identity of participants in the abortion
debate. One (particularly harsh) description of pro-choice and pro-life proponents, for
example, examines this division in explicit terms:
Support for abortion comes primarily from men and women Who admit to
enjoying sexual activity and want safeguards for that pleasure. They have
attained new realms of experience, which they have no wish to abandon. Apart
from a small minority, they are not swingers or spouse-swappers or even un-
necessarily unfaithful. They compose a new class of Americans, for whom
intercourse is an important leisure pursuit. But it is also an activity that needs
abortion as a backup.
[O]pponents of abortion want to see an end to youthful sexual intimacy
. . . Opponents of abortion see the pursuit of pleasure as contaminating our
age .... [Opponents of abortion do not say they are opposed to sexual activity,
only that it must be enjoyed in marriage, and best on the sparing side.
Andrew Hacker, Of Two Minds About Abortion, HARPER'S, Sept. 1979, at 16, 18, 22.
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dent on that right. Other component aspects of the right to have
an abortion, such as the woman's interest in bodily integrity, are
vulnerable to the following argument. A person's interest in bodily
integrity, and a person's interest in personal liberty, are not pro-
tected against state intrusion if the individual's prior discretionary
conduct places his or her bodily integrity and liberty interests at
risk. 148
 If you join the Air Force and sign up to fly jets, you cannot
protest being ordered to take a physical examination. If you violate
the law and become addicted to a controlled substance, such as
heroin, you may be incarcerated prior to trial, convicted and forced
to undergo withdrawal symptoms. 149 Even outside of the prison
context, the state clearly may constitutionally cut off your source of
supply.
A similar analogy applies to abortion. If there is no right to
sexual autonomy, by prohibiting abortion the state does not force
anyone to undergo the burden of pregnancy, birth and mother-
148
 For example, in United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1973), defendant
(Moore) challenged his conviction for possessing narcotics on the grounds that the compulsion
of his addiction forced him to acquire the illegal drugs. In rejecting his claim, Judge Wilkey
explained:
[W]e cannot ignore how the defendant became an addict . . . Moore could
never put the needle in his arm the first and many succeeding times without
an exercise of will. His illegal acquisition and possession are thus the direct product
of a freely willed illegal act.
According to [Moore's] thesis, an addict only has a choice as to the manner
in which he obtains the funds (or the drugs) to support his habit; this neglects
the choice that each addict makes at the start as to whether or not he is going to
take narcotics and run the risk of becoming addicted to them. Although the
narcotics user may soon through continued use acquire a compulsion to have
the drug, and thus be said to have lost his self-control ... due to a "disease," it
is a disease which he has induced himself through a violation of the law.
Id. at 1151.
In response to the argument that an addict cannot be punished solely on the basis of
his status, under Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), Judge Wilkey continued:
Mt is not inconsistent to say that an addict may not be punished for his craving
(his 'addiction') but may be punished when he makes the decision not to subject
himself to the admittedly painful process of withdrawal, gives in to his craving
and commits acts in violation of law and which continue his addiction.
Moore, 486 F.2d at 1153.
149
 "The government has no constitutional obligation to provide treatment for narcotics
addiction" of parolees, pretrial detainees or convicted prisoners. Butler v. United States
Parole Comm'n, 570 F. Supp. 67, 72 (M.D. Pa. 1983). Similarly, neither prisoners nor pretrial
detainees who suffer from drug addiction have any right to receive methadone through a
drug maintenance program. Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183, 1188 (3d Cir. 1978); Holly v.
Rapone, 476 F. Supp. 226, 230 (E.D. Pa. 1979). Prisoners, however, must receive timely
medical treatment for withdrawal symptoms. United States ex rd. Walker v. Fayette Cty., Pa.,
599 F.2d 573, 576 (3d Cir. 1979). The quality of that treatment will not be reviewed seriously
as long as it is reasonable. Holly, 476 F. Supp. at 233.
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hood. Leaving aside cases of rape, incest and other forms of coer-
cion, 15° the woman can escape any burden on her bodily integrity
by never engaging in sexual activity. The availability of this prior
choice undercuts the argument that abortion prohibitions violate a
woman's bodily integrity by forcing her to carry an unwanted preg-
nancy to term. As in the case of the addict, withdrawal symptoms
and pregnancy are the consequences of earlier private decisions
that are not the state's responsibility.
The force of this analogy cannot be avoided by arguing that
the use of heroin is illegal, while heterosexual intercourse is not.
That is not always the case. Although anti-adultery, anti-fornication
and gender-neutral statutory rape laws are seldom enforced with
rigor in cases of consensual sexual relationships,"' in technical
terms, many abortions terminate pregnancies that resulted from
illegal conduct.' 52 The state may not use anti-abortion laws to punish
people who engage in illegal sex,'" but the decision to engage in
illegal sexual activity may deprive a woman of the argument that
forcing her to continue her pregnancy violates her right to bodily
integrity. That consequence was fully avoidable as long as she com-
plied with the relevant law. The state's claim that the way to avoid
interference with one's bodily integrity is to practice abstinence can
only be conclusively repudiated if the decision to engage in sexual
activity is protected as a fundamental right. Indeed, unless one
posits some right to engage in heterosexual relationships, the right
to an abortion is necessarily tied to the state's discretionary decisions
as to the sexual activity it will permit.
Although the right to have an abortion reinforces and protects
a woman's right to sexual autonomy, it does not serve that objective
uniformly throughout the gestation period. The burden that the
risk of pregnancy and childbirth imposes on a woman considering
a sexual encounter is largely avoided by providing her with suffi-
15° The range of what constitutes coercive sexual activity clearly may extend beyond
forcible rape. See generally CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987).
151 See Richard Green, Griswold's Legacy: Fornication and Adultery as Crimes, 16 Onto N.U.
L. REV. 545, 548 (1989) (adultery and fornication laws seldom enforced); John A. Robertson,
Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405,
418-19 & n.36 (1983).
153 See generally Green, supra note 151, at 546 & nn.7, 8 (twenty-five states penalize
adultery and thirteen states penalize fornication).
153 See, e.g., the Court's comment in Eisenstadt that "bit would be plainly unreasonable to
assume that [the state] has prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child [or the
physical and psychological dangers of an abortion] as punishment for fornication." Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972).
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cient time to make a deliberate, informed and reflective choice as
to whether or not she wants to carry her pregnancy to term.'"
Providing substantially less time than this, thereby forcing the
woman to make a precipitate choice, would not achieve the desired
result. Less obviously, providing substantially more time is of little
utility. In terms of the woman's right to sexual autonomy, unless
there is a material change of circumstances during pregnancy, a
significantly reduced benefit is derived from permitting her to have
an abortion after she has had sufficient time and information to
make a deliberate choice.
We do not suggest what period of time would be sufficient. We
assert simply that in a legal environment in which abortion was
generally illegal, recognizing the right to have an abortion during
the first several months of pregnancy would substantially promote
the sexual autonomy of women. Conversely, in a legal environment
in which abortions were freely available during the first seven
months of pregnancy, allowing abortion during the remaining two
months would add little to women's sexual autonomy. The knowl-
edge that this additional time to decide to have an abortion is
available will not create a significantly greater sense that an un-
wanted birth can be avoided. Thus, the extent to which the right
to have an abortion protects the right of women to sexual autonomy
declines as the pregnancy progresses. In many cases, the right to
an abortion will be of no significant additional value to the woman,
with regard to her interest in sexual autonomy, during the latter
part of her pregnancy.
A similar analysis applies with regard to the right of bodily
integrity.' 55
 We see no need to elaborate on the obvious fact that
being forced to carry a pregnancy to term constitutes a massive
154 See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 138, at 59-62 (arguing that a woman must be
provided a reasonable period of time to discover her pregnancy and to determine "whether
to enter into a symbiotic relationship with the fetus and newborn and, more generally, into
a relationship of parenthood").
' 5' Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized a formal right to bodily
integrity, In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1245-46 (D.C. 1990) (en bane), a long line of cases
demonstrates that a person's bodily autonomy is constitutionally protected against state-
mandated invasion or intrusion. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct.
2841, 2851 (1990) ("[Al constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions."); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S.
753, 766 (1985); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952); Union Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). The right, of course, is not absolute. See Cruzan, 110 S.
Ct. at 2851-52; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966). The right to bodily
integrity is only a part of the foundation on which the right to have an abortion is grounded.
See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 789 n.202 (1989).
July 1992] THE CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY OF ABORTION 	 755
invasion of a woman's bodily integrity. Other writers have made the
point abundantly clear. 15€ The fact that many women welcome the
experience of pregnancy, childbirth and motherhood is simply ir-
relevant to this discussion. It is in the nature of personal rights of
this kind that the same event can be alternatively viewed as ecstasy
and fulfillment or degradation and destruction, depending on
whether it is freely chosen. This holds equally true for sexual re-
lationships, pregnancy and childbirth, or less physical, but also
highly personal activities, such as the practice of religion. In terms
of the impact on the individual, in many ways the appropriate
analogy to forcing someone to continue an unwanted pregnancy is
rape or coerced religious conversion.' 57
The critical point for the purposes of this article, however, is
that the woman's interest in the continuing availability of abortion
as a means to protect her bodily integrity declines during the ges-
tation period. In one sense, this is a counterintuitive conclusion.
Obviously, the last trimester of the pregnancy is in many ways the
most physically problematic for a woman. We are not suggesting,
however, that a woman has no important interest in her bodily
integrity during the last months of her pregnancy. What we suggest
is that the right to have an abortion at that time does not protect
the right to bodily integrity to the same extent as an early abortion,
especially when the delivery of the baby would create no special
health risks for the mother.
This is so for two reasons. First, the pregnancy is almost over.
The last months of pregnancy simply cannot constitute the same
physical burden as nine months of pregnancy which include, of
course, the last months as well. We do not intend to understate the
physical difficulties of the third trimester, but we do not think that
we do so by recognizing the substantial physical burdens a woman
undergoes during the earlier part of her pregnancy, which cannot
be avoided, of course, by a late term abortion.'"
I" See Regan, supra note 125, at 1617 ("[A]nyone who attempts simply to deny that there
is an intrinsic horror to unwanted pregnancy lacks either imagination or compassion.").
17 See Law, supra note 91, at 1021 ("`However gratifying pregnancy may be to a woman
who desires it, for the unwilling it is literally an invasion—the closest analogy is the difference
between lovemaking and rape."' (quoting Ellen Willis, Abortion: Is a Woman a Person?, in
POWERS OF DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 473 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983))).
158 See generally ARTHUR D. COLMAN & LIBBY LEE COLMAN, PREGNANCY: THE PSYCHOLOG-
ICAL EXPERIENCE 34 (1973) (describing "weakness, nausea, morning sickness, and even severe
vomiting . . . that may lead a woman to restrict her usual activities [during the first trimester
of pregnancy]").
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Second, a late term abortion is a greater physical burden and
medical risk than an early abortion.'" In terms of its physical effect,
it may be comparable to childbirth.m Because a late term abortion
is a serious surgical procedure,'°' as the pregnancy progresses the
woman loses the opportunity to avoid the medical risk and physical
discomfort she may escape through an early abortion. Thus, as the
pregnancy progresses the value of an abortion in relieving the
woman of physical burdens and risks may be reduced substantially.
2. The Right to Psychological Independence and Integrity
The impact of pregnancy on a woman's psychological condition
and sense of self is as powerful as its effect on her physical being.
Robin West describes how "the radical feminist argument for re-
productive freedom" 162 is grounded on this perception. In blunt
terms, unwanted "pregnancy is a dangerous, psychically consuming,
19 See Mary Anne Wood & Lisa Bolin Hawkins, State Regulation of Late Abortion and the
Physician's Duty of Care to the Viable Fetus, 45 Mo. L. REV. 394, 400 (1980) ("'Few risks in
obstetrics are more certain than that which occurs to a ... [woman] undergoing abortion
after the 14th week of pregnancy. –
 (quoting Johann Duenhoelter & Norman F. Gant,
Complications Following Prostaglandin Fla—Induced Midtrimester Abortion, 46 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 247, 250 (1975)).
160 As one author notes:
Regardless of the agent used in amnioinfusion, it shbuld be recognized that
there is a similarity between the basic process of second trimester abortion and
term delivery. Both events depend on the active participation of the uterine
musculature in the process of self-evacuation. In cases of malfunction, the
greater the uterine size, the more severe are the ensuing complications. This is
especially evident in the case of hemorrhage and infection, the two leading
obstetrical complications at almost any stage of gestation. Therefore, expectant
"labor floor" management should be employed, including the continuous pres-
ence of obstetrically trained nursing and physician house staff ... 'on call' on
a 24-hour basis.
Thomas D. Kerenyi, Intraamniogic Techniques, in ABORTION AND STERILIZATION: MEDICAL AND
SOCIAL ASPECTS 359, 372-73 ( Jane E. Hodgson ed., 1981); see also Wood & Hawkins, supra
note 159, at 396-401 (describing saline and prostaglandin instillation methods of late abor-
tions as involving the induction of labor and hysterotomy abortions which are similar to
caesarean sections).
161 Medical authorities regularly report that the health consequences for the mother in
having an abortion become more dangerous and severe the later the abortion occurs in the
pregnancy. See, e.g., SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOCIAL SERVICES ET AL., Report of the Com-
mittee on the Working of the Abortion Act 237-41 (Gr. Brit. 1974) [hereinafter ABORTION
ACT REPORT] (explaining that the duration of the pregnancy significantly affects the incidence
of morbidity and medical complications resulting from abortion in part because the methods
of termination used early in the gestation period are unavailable for later abortions); RODMAN
ET AL., supra note 87, at 65-68 (noting that risk of death or nonfatal complication from
abortion increases substantially and progressively after twelve weeks of pregnancy).
' 62 Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 30 (1988).
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existentially intrusive, and physically invasive assault upon the body
which in turn leads to a dangerous, consuming, intrusive, invasive
assault on the mother's self-identity." 163 Women may experience this
condition as threatening their ability to control their lives, or as
surrendering their lives to another being. In a fundamental way,
pregnancy "blurs the physical• boundary between self and other, and
that blurring of boundaries between self and other constitutes a
profound invasion of the self's physical integrity."64
This blurring of one's individuality, arising from the unique
interrelationship and attachment that exists between the pregnant
woman and the conceptus, is not a static condition. It changes and
increases in intensity throughout the gestation period.' 65 Similarly,
the bonding between mother and conceptus matures through the
pregnancy and .birth.' 66 Thus, the fact that the great majority of
women who elect to have an abortion choose to do so in the first
trimester confirms "the sense that most women have, in term preg-
nancies, of developmental differences that correspond to differ-
ences, changes, in their relationship/obligation/bond to the fetus." 167
163 Id. at 30.
164 Id. at 32. West explains that while radical feminists of the sixties described pregnancy
in terms of the language quoted in the text, radical feminists of the eighties would describe
heterosexual intercourse in similar terms. See Id.
165 Rosalind Petchesky explains:
The pregnant woman, whether she wants the fetus or not, is caught up irrevocably
in a condition of intimacy with and perhaps longing for it as well. The experi-
ence of going through a full-term pregnancy, bearing a child, and giving it up
for adoption is punitive and traumatic for a woman because the relationship by
then is real; it exists. No woman who has ever borne a child needs to be told
that its "personality" and certainly its relationship to her begin to emerge well
before its birth.
ROSALIND POLLACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION. AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY AND
REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 346 (1984).
' 66 In Robert Goldstein's words:
The physical evolution of pregnancy points the way toward further intimacy
with the infant to be . [Tihe woman may identify the fetus with herself and
her own inner world of thoughts and feelings .... The woman's experience of
pregnancy and anticipation of motherhood in the last trimester, as well as
hormonal changes, have typically led to a deep self-absorption tlit she can
make available to her newborn. Through this powerful identification with the
fetus within and then with the infant who "at first seems like a part of herself,"
women in health achieve a very powerful sense "for what the infant needs."
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 138, 66-67.
167 PETCHESKY, supra note 165, at 347; see also GROBSTEIN, supra note 117, at 141 (describ-
ing change in attitude that occurs "when a prospective mother who has been ambivalent or
negative about her pregnancy undergoes emotional bonding on experiencing the reality of
her developing offspring through the technology of ultrasound imaging").
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As'a result of this deepening sense of attachment, connection
and identification, it is not surprising to hear the experience of
putting a child up for adoption described as "psychological ampu-
tation" or a loss of self or mutilation."'" Thus, many women who
do not want to be pregnant or to have a child are ultimately con-
fronted with a wrenching fragmentation of their psychological in-
tegrity if they carry the conceptus to term. The impact on the
mother of putting a baby up for adoption may be long-term and
severe.' 69
Nothing we say here is intended to •undermine the moral sig-
nificance of giving birth to a baby and putting the baby up for
adoption, rather than having an abortion. The moral merit of that
decision, however, reflects in part the self-sacrifice of the woman
who•makes it. More importantly, despite the rectitude of adoption,
few women would intentionally elect to become pregnant in order
to provide a baby for someone else to raise. Clearly, one of the
reasons a woman who does not want to raise a child seeks to avoid
pregnancy is her interest in avoiding the emotional experience of
bearing a baby only to give it up to adopting parents.' 7°
Providing women the right to have an abortion permits them
to escape this consequence, but its helpfulness in that regard de-
clines as the pregnancy progresses. As the bond between mother
and conceptus deepens, the psychological impact of permanent
separation becomes an inevitable and unavoidable cost, however it
is brought about. For abortion to protect the woman's sense of self
and emotional well-being, the abortion must occur before the con-
nection between mother and conceptus intensifies to the point of
fusion and bonding."' As the pregnancy continues into the third
169 See ARTHUR SOROSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE: THE EFFECTS OF THE SEALED
RECORD ON ADOPTERS, BIRTH PARENTS, AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS 56 (1978); Leverett Millen &
Samuel Roll, Solomon's Mothers: A Special Case of Pathological BereaveMent, 55 Am. J. Oirruop-
SYCHIATRY 911,413 (1985). Both sources are cited in GOLDSTEIN, supra note 138 at 194-95.
169 See, e.g., PAUL SACHDEV, UNLOCKING THE ADOPTION FILES 9-10 (1989) (describing
studies that find that the birth mother "never really forgets the child she relinquished" and
continues to experience feelings of pain, loss and grief as long as forty years after the
adoption); SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 168, at 58 (many birth parents continue "to have
feelings of loss, pain, and mourning" long after adoption occurs).
17° For the pregnant woman who must bear an unwanted child if the right to have an
abortion is denied, the alternative of adoption may also involve "the misappropriation of her
genetic procreative power, her body and its strength during pregnancy, her associational
capacity, and her attachments and identity as a mother." GOLDSTEIN, supra note 138, at 65-
66.
171 Abortions later in the pregnancy produce significantly greater emotional distress for
the pregnant woman. See, e.g., ABORTION ACT REPORT, supra note 161, at 53 ("Emotional
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trimester, the importance of abortion as a means of protecting the
psychological integrity of the woman becomes particularly doubtful.
If there are no special health risks to be considered, the alleged
psychological benefit to a woman of destroying a conceptus in order
not to experience birth and adoption would seem to be of 'very
uncertain weight.'" •
C. The Intersection of Moral Interests and Fundamental Rights
One could imagine a graph where the y-axis measures the
importance of the interests at stake and the x-axis measures the
nine months of pregnancy. The line representing the privacy and
autonomy interests of the woman curves downward during the
gestation period. The line representing the moral status of the
conceptus curves upward during the same period.'" The point at
which these lines cross establishes the foundation for the state reg-
ulation of abortion in opposition to the discretionary choice of the
woman. At that intersection, the woman's interest in having an
abortion, grounded on her sexual autonomy and bodily and psy-
chological integrity, is no longer of sufficient force and value to
distress is more likely in late abortions, after fetal movements have been felt and maternal
feelings have been aroused."); Nancy E. Adler & Peggy Dolcini, Psychological Issues in Abortion
for Adolescents, in ADOLESCENT ABORTION 74, 86 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1986) (finding that
patients who have abortions in second trimester feel a greater sense of loss than do women
having abortions earlier in pregnancy); Irene Figa-Talamanca, Abortion and Mental Health, in
ABORTION AND STERILIZATION: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS, supra note 160, at 181; Howard
J. Osofsky et al., Psychological Effects of Abortion: With Emphasis upon Immediate Reactions and
Followup, in THE ABORTION EXPERIENCE, 188, 201-02 (Howard J. Osofsky & Joy D. Osofsky
eds., 1973) (reporting greater post-abortion feelings of guilt and depression in women having
second trimester as opposed to first trimester abortions); Nancy B. Kaltreider, Emotional
Patterns Related to Delay in Decision to Seek Legal Abortion—A Pilot Study, 118(5) CAL. MED. 23-
27 (1973) (women having second trimester abortions talk more often about their "babies"
while women having first trimester abortions discuss their "pregnancy" or "condition"). This
reality is also reflected in the philosophical literature. See, e.g., GLOVER, supra note 18, at 142.
172 One physician who performs late second trimester and early third trimester abortions
explained that the women seeking to terminate advanced pregnancies "face choices that are
agonizing, no matter how their pregnancy ends up." He concluded, "I deal with tragedy,
that's all I do." Gina Kolata, Late Abortions: Tough to Decide, Tough to Get, DAVIS ENTERPRISE,
Jan. 5, 1992, at Al, A3. One woman who elected to have a late term abortion after learning
of the severe medical problems of the fetus she was carrying described her feelings: "'A very
big part of me just wanted to have the baby and hold him until he died.'" Id.
1" See GLOVER, supra note 18, at 126 ("[T]he transition from fertilized egg to adult, like
many biological' developments, can better be represented by a fairly steady upward curve
then by a series of obviously discrete stages with abrupt transitions."). Tooley rejects this
incremental, change by degrees model as "unsound," or at least not supported by the
evidence. TOOLEY, supra note 114, at 409. His conclusion is based in part on his rejection of
any moral obligation regarding potential or possible persons. Id. at 165-284.
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completely outweigh the state's moral concerns in protecting poten-
tial life.
Describing the general parameters of this model for the pur-
pose of evaluating the constitutionality of abortion regulations
leaves many issues open for debate. These include, for example,
the time that a woman requires to make a deliberate, reflective and
informed choice as to whether or not she wants to have a baby; a
comparison of the medical procedures available for late term abor-
tions with the procedures involved in childbirth to determine the
extent to which a woman's bodily integrity continues to be substan-
tially furthered by the decision to have an abortion; an examination
of the psychological consequences of late term abortions; and a
more vigorous inquiry into the condition and experience of prenatal
life.
The resulting constitutional framework based on this model
will parallel Roe v. Wade in one fundamental respect. Early abortions
will be constitutionally protected, and late abortions, except in spe-
cial circumstances, will not. The duration of these periods and
exactly how the balance of rights and interests is to be resolved for
mid-term abortions will depend on the careful determination and
balancing of the factors described.' 74 If the conceptus does not
achieve moral standing before the woman's right to an abortion
substantially decreases in value, the resulting analysis will be rela-
tively straightforward. That is the likely result with regard to first
trimester abortions.'" If the conceptus achieves moral standing
during that part of the pregnancy in which the right to an abortion
is of vital significance to the woman, a direct confrontation between
morally recognized life and constitutionally protected rights must
be resolved for that period.'" Alternatively, it is also possible that
a court would determine that these variables can only be discussed
in terms of gradually increasing and decreasing values during the
middle of the gestation period. This reasoning would suggest that
the range of ascending and declining values will cross at an inde-
"4 See, e.g., GotosTEIN, supra note 138, at 60-62, for a cogent, but brief, discussion of
why women often need more time than the first trimester in order to make an informed,
deliberate and reflective choice about whether or not to terminate a pregnancy.
During the first trimester, there is little basis for arguing that the conceptus experi-
ences a life worth living, and the woman's autonomy and integrity interests remain very high.
176 The likelihood of this conflict arising would depend on how early during the gestation
period a life worth living is determined to occur, and how much time women would ordinarily
require to make a deliberate, informed and reflective choice as to whether or not to carry
the pregnancy to term.
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terminate point, a conclusion on which a variety of regulatory re-
sponses might be based. Finally, there will be various atypical situ-
ations in which general rules will not apply, cases in which changed
circumstances or delayed information create or strengthen a wom-
an's interests in an abortion later in the gestation period.'" All these
questions remain to be decided, but the grounds for deciding them
are available and amenable to reasoned debate.
In many ways, this process may seem coldly clinical on the one
hand and incapable of accurate generalization on the other. Both
criticisms are justified, but they are also unavoidable. The conflict
over abortion rights can only be resolved with passion and easy
generalization if one or the other extreme position is adopted.
Those positions, however, are neither persuasive nor justifiable.
They may be enforced through the exercise of power, but for many
of us, this would be done without conviction. Alternatively, a com-
promise position may evolve, not out of any meeting of the minds
on the merits of the issue, but rather as a political accommodation,
achieving as much for each side as their respective resources of
political power can provide. That process, however, may produce a
result that is substantively indefensible. Its validity would depend
on our commitment to the political process that produced it. The
Constitution would be largely irrelevant to this approach.
The thesis of this article is that there is a middle ground in the
abortion debate that has an intellectually commanding position to
assert as a matter of constitutional adjudication. Its passion is the
commitment to do justice to conflicting values that are both worthy
of some respect. That objective can never be determined or de-
fended with the clarity of arguments that consider only one side in
a debate. The approach we propose does, however, shift the debate
away from competing world views and unanswerable imponderables
to questions that are capable of principled judicial and political
resolution.
17 This would typically be the case, for example, when the physical status of the woman
or the fetus changes in an unexpected way late in the gestation period, or when information
about the physical condition of the woman or the fetus is discovered late in the gestation
period. See Kolata, supra note 172, at AS.
